Appeal: Denied Entreaty for Prior Ponderance III (Ch. 2025)

Status
Not open for further replies.
Nyeogmi

Nyeogmi

New member
Joined
Jun 14, 2025
Messages
20
IN THE CHANCERY OF ALEXANDRIA
ENTREATY FOR PRIOR PONDERANCE

Honorable Chancellors, I request prior ponderance and a ruling regarding an unsettled matter of law.

I. BACKGROUND

In A.P. 01-006 19.(3) Conspiracy is defined this way:

> (3) Conspiracy - If multiple players have the specific intent to commit a crime, agree to commit that crime, and at least one of them takes an overt act in furtherance of the criminal conspiracy, they are guilty of that offense.

II. CAUSE OF ACTION

As described, players in a conspiracy are "guilty of that offense."

Suppose three players agree to this plan:
  • A will obtain rope and give it to C
  • The next morning, B will drive C to Paul's house
  • C will strangle Paul
They actually do carry out this plan and kill Paul the next day. The Crown charges A, B and C for this.

The questions
  • Is A guilty of Murder ("that offense") or Conspiracy to Murder (a separate offense not named?)
  • Under the same facts, is C separately guilty of Murder and Conspiracy to Murder?
III. SENTENCING GUIDELINES

A possible answer from the previous section is that A is guilty of Conspiracy to Murder, but not guilty of Murder.

In that case, given that Conspiracy to Murder is a separate cause of action from Murder, what sentence can A be given?

IV. OVERT ACTS

Now suppose the same conspiracy is planned, but the actual events go differently than A, B and C intended:
  • A really does obtain a rope, but while obtaining the rope, leaks critical details of the plan to D, the rope merchant
  • D tells the Crown about the plan and the Crown investigates
  • B and C are individually apprehended at home before having left
In this case, it appears only A has taken an overt act, but A's overt act is a necessary fact for B and C's guilt.

If A had described the plan to E (A's wife) and been arrested then instead of leaving to buy the rope, it does not seem likely that B and C could be charged.

V. OVERT ACTS, II

Now suppose a slightly different conspiracy is planned:
  • A and B will go to F's Diner and obtain F's Big Breakfast the morning before the murder
  • That night, A will obtain rope and give it to C
  • The next morning, B will drive C to Paul's house
  • C will strangle Paul
Unfortunately for A and B, when they finish their Big Breakfasts, law enforcement surrounds F's Diner and they are arrested without any chance to go obtain rope.

As in the previous pattern of facts, A and B have taken an overt act in furtherance of the stated plan. In both fact patterns, the overt act (buying rope, eating F's Big Breakfast) is not an act that would ordinarily be illegal.

The question: are A and B's breakfast plans relevant to establishing conspiracy?

VI. OVERT ACTS, III

Now suppose the previous conspiracy is planned, but one additional hitch occurs:
  • Before A and B go to F's diner, unbeknownst to A and B, C goes to the local dog park and kicks five dogs in the head, one of whom happens to be Paul's.
This is not the plan that A and B made. However, what C did is certainly a crime affecting Paul.

The question: can A and B be charged? And can they be charged with anything relevant to C's additional crimes?

VII. CONCLUSIONS

This set of examples is intended to elicit answers to these broader questions:
  • Are there distinct causes of action for murder and conspiracy to murder?
    • Is it possible for one person to be charged with both, over the same facts?
  • Is a criminal conspiracy in any way distinct from a group agreement to commit a crime?
    • Does it incorporate elements such as a plan?
  • What is an "'overt act in furtherance of the criminal conspiracy"?
    • Is it necessary that the act be illegal in itself?
    • Is there a distinction between acts like acquiring the rope (that are in some sense necessary) and acts like the dinner plan (that seem obviously unnecessary)
    • Can unrelated crimes against the same victims be overt acts?
Respectfully submitted to the Chancery on June 15, 2025,
Nyeogmi Choi
 
Last edited:
YRKrp9o.png

IN THE CHANCERY OF
THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
REFUSAL OF WRIT
​
After deliberation, the Chancery has decided that the questions presented do not pass the standards we require to properly consider, and so we deny to hear them.

For a Writ of Prior Ponderance to be granted, the Chancery must behold an entreaty posed that is: (1) Valid as a question, (2) important enough to demand the attention of this court, (3) written in good faith, (4) ambiguous, and (5) a question of interpretation. P.P. II (Ch. 2025, writ ref'd). Of the five elements above, we find these questions to surely be written in good faith and ambiguous in the context they are asked in. However, we do not believe they are truly questions of legislative interpretation, important enough to demand our attention, or valid as a question.
​
-=-​

First, we do not believe these questions are questions of interpretation. A question of interpretation arises when the writing on legislation is ambiguous on its face, and reasonable persons could come up with two or more equally plausible interpretations that are materially different. Here, though there could be different interpretations, and those interpretations could be reasonable, we do not believe the questions presented are those. Instead, we believe that the questions presented are questions of application, trying to work through a tree of possible items and get answers for all of them. We prefer to stick closer to the interpretation of wording, not necessarily how that wording must be carried out—though we appreciate these lines can become quite blurred. Here, the questions posed do not show a tendency for interpretation to be questioned—but rather that the writfeasor is personally confused by the questions at hand. Though we are sympathetic to them, personal confusion alone does not meet the bar to demand an answer from us at this time.

Second, we find that these questions are not important enough to command our attention. Whether a question is important enough is a matter for the Chancery alone. See id. We do not wish to be bound to answer any small question that appears before us, and so we are selective and reserve the right to refuse writ as we please. Here, this question is not one that urgently applies to the welfare of the citizenry, and it surely is a question that can be answered in the course of a trial without causing harm in the intervening waiting period. Additionally, we anticipate the criminal law will somewhat mirror the atmosphere of its real-life counterpart—that is, put frankly, a mess. We do not wish to wade into that cesspit at this time and without real examples to work with.

Third, these questions are not valid as questions themselves. The makeup of the "validity" of a question is nebulous by design. Here we adopt a "you know it when you see it" approach to a question which is valid.

Valid questions, generally, are those whose context is firmly rooted in a reasonable situation and would tend to apply in the lion's share of cases where the question may arise, while also being reasonable to desire a general legal rule on. The question, for example, of "what is the color green?" is firmly not a valid question for us to ponder. Here, giving a rash of scenarios based on language that is not alleged to be legislatively ambiguous (see above) but rather trying to understand how those scenarios would play out is not a valid question in the context of asking about the interpretation of that language.

The question of validity is intended to be a low bar to meet, and both a casual filter for the Chancery and a final barrier against potentially prejudicial questions. We use this element here in the former instance, and believe that these questions are not valid because of the lack of generality or reasonableness behind them. It should be noted that we do not think the writfeasor is unreasonable in asking these questions at all, more that it is unreasonable to ask them standing on their own before the Chancery.
​
-=-​

Asking hypotheticals about an element of the law one may be personally confused or unsure of is not valid, regardless of how reasonable that confusion may be. A Writ of Prior Ponderance is for filling critical holes in the common law and providing reasonable expectations for citizens to follow. If nothing else, we do not wish to deprive the growing legal community of oxygen. We have taken note of legal articles popping up, and we wish to encourage their continued prosperity. Allowing for questions such as this would smother those publications in their cradles. We hope the writfeasor and the Kingdom at-large can see both our legal and policy considerations at play here.

In closing, we refuse to grant this writ because the questions presented were not questions of interpretation, were not of a high enough importance to demand immediate and legally binding attention, and were not valid when observed. This does not mean that the questions above did not have some academic, legal, or social merit, or have one true "correct" answer. We fully expect to see this question return before us again—but to do so properly, it should be after a case is litigated in the court below, and appealed to us. Finally, criminal law is messy and imprecise. We do not seek to shove hard lines and definitive statements into the infantile repository of criminal law at this time. That law must develop more naturally and through example, rather than theoretical conjecture.

We thank the writfeasor and spectators for their time and patience.​
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top