Lawsuit: Dismissed Alliance 25 / The Greens for Alexandria v. Crown of Alexandria, Case VII (2026)

[Capt11543]

IN THE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
ENTREATY FOR CONTINUANCE


Your Honors, the Plaintiffs have assigned new counsel (me) to this case in order to effectuate a change in strategy.

To be clear: we wish to rescind our request to waive our opening statement.

Plaintiff's Counsel also requests continuance such that the opening statement deadline falls 72 hours from this post.


Respectfully submitted,
Capt B. Numbers
Plaintiff's Counsel

Spoiler: Proof of Representation

 

[Capt11543]

IN THE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
ENTREATY TO AMEND COMPLAINT


Your Honors,

Plaintiffs seek to amend Section III. Facts of our complaint (Alliance 25 / The Greens for Alexandria v. Crown of Alexandria, Case VII (Ch. 2026) #1) in the following manner:

III. FACTS

1. On July 20th 2026, at approximately 15:48 UTC, the Speaker of Parliament declared passage of a motion to impeach Member of Parliament FSXSteamBoss for lack of playtime. (P-001)
2. Section 11(1) of the A.P.00-018 | Alexandrian Electoral Act provides that "In the event of a vacancy in Parliament, if Parliament cannot agree on a replacement within 72 hours, a Special Election shall be held."
3. Parliament later, on July 31st at approximately 4:20 UTC, passed a motion to appoint TurtleDude241 to the vacant seat in Parliament. (P-002)
4. The motion to appoint TurtleDude241 passed approximately 10 days after Member of Parliament FSXSteamBoss was removed from their seat, over 7 days more than the allowed time under the Alexandrian Electoral Act.
5. The Speaker of Parliament permitted the motion to appoint TurtleDude241 with the reasoning "Now, I don't think we are quite there yet as I don't think Parliament has had enough time to agree or disagree to a replacement ...". (P-003)

We seek this amendment noting that the statement being struck, "...over 7 days more than the allowed time under the Alexandrian Electoral Act," relates to our legal argument. We do not wish to confuse the central legal dispute of the case as a dispute over the facts.


Respectfully submitted,
Capt B. Numbers
Plaintiff's Counsel

 

[ConsequencesInc]

IN THE HONOURABLE CHANCERY
OF THE SOVEREIGN KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
Case No.: 7
Objection to Entreaty to Amend Complaint

IN THE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
ENTREATY TO AMEND COMPLAINT


Your Honors,

Plaintiffs seek to amend Section III. Facts of our complaint (Alliance 25 / The Greens for Alexandria v. Crown of Alexandria, Case VII (Ch. 2026) #1) in the following manner:



We seek this amendment noting that the statement being struck, "...over 7 days more than the allowed time under the Alexandrian Electoral Act," relates to our legal argument. We do not wish to confuse the central legal dispute of the case as a dispute over the facts.


Respectfully submitted,
Capt B. Numbers
Plaintiff's Counsel

Your Honors,


The Crown objects to this Entreaty to Amend the Complaint on the grounds of procedure.

The General Court Rules and Procedures are quite clear: "At anytime during the course of discovery, the plaintiff or the Crown may amend their Complaint" in terms of Parties, Facts, Claims and Prayers for Relief. See §II (3) General Court Rules and Procedures, 2025. The fact of the matter that Discovery lapsed yesterday as per the Honorable SmallFries post. The Plaintiff cannot amend their complaint any longer.


Respectfully submitted,
Stephen W. Spooner Jr.
Solicitor General.

 

[ConsequencesInc]

IN THE HONOURABLE CHANCERY
OF THE SOVEREIGN KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
Case No.: 7
Entreaty to Dismiss


Your Honor,

The Crown moves to dismiss the legal fees claim in this case, as well as their entire case, on the grounds that there is a lack of claim, with prejudice.

First and foremost, in terms of legal fees, the official response of the Plaintiff was:

The number was drawn from another proceedings in the Chancery, namely SoggehToast v. Crown, Case VI (2026).

I find this to be a frivolous claim. The initial filing of the case the Plaintiff mentioned, noted that the £2000 legal fees was "to reflect the services rendered by MikamiLaw in its legal representation of the Plaintiff" See SoggehToast v. Crown, Case VI (Ch. 2026). To quote the Honorable Justice SmallFries earlier in this case: "Are you saying you have nothing to substantiate that number? You just made it up?" See Alliance 25 / The Greens for Alexandria v. Crown of Alexandria, Case VII (Ch. 2026)

Your honors, I believe the answer to that question is yes.

The facts of the matter for the "legal fees" are as follows:

1. MikamiLaw is not representing Plaintiff
2. The Plaintiff cannot produce any receipts from on or before filing the case for the £2000
3. The Plaintiff literally just took a random number from another case's legal fees just because they could

Therefore, we ask the Court to dismiss the Plaintiff's claim for legal fees.


Furthermore, the entire claim of the Plaintiff rests on the claim that they were "blatantly deprived of their right to contest a special election as a political party". And the fact that they were "blatantly deprived" or deprived of an right to contest the election is not in the facts section of their filling.

Please note, that in their entire filing there are no references to what "right to contest a special election" was violated, either in the Law or the Constitution. I would assume such a right would exist in one of those places, and it is ultimately up to the original filer of the case to present those rights as facts to be inspected, selected, contested, erected, disputed and refuted in a Court of Law.

They have not shown or given reference to what right of their was violated, just generally with a wave of the hand and magic pixie dust that such a thing was.

I believe that the Courtroom, and especially the Courtroom of the Chancery of Alexandria, is not a place for mere assumptions and assertations. It is a place for dialectical battle of the truth of facts.

Given that all their facts and evidence show is that allegedly it took awhile to appoint a Member of Parliament, and they do not specify what right or law was violated that guarantees their "right to contest a special election", we ask the Court to dismiss this case with the highest amount of prejudice one can muster.


Respectfully submitted,
Stephen W. Spooner Jr.
Solicitor General.

 

[Capt11543]

IN THE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
ENTREATY TO AMEND COMPLAINT


Your Honors,

Plaintiffs seek to amend Section III. Facts of our complaint (Alliance 25 / The Greens for Alexandria v. Crown of Alexandria, Case VII (Ch. 2026) #1) in the following manner:



We seek this amendment noting that the statement being struck, "...over 7 days more than the allowed time under the Alexandrian Electoral Act," relates to our legal argument. We do not wish to confuse the central legal dispute of the case as a dispute over the facts.


Respectfully submitted,
Capt B. Numbers
Plaintiff's Counsel

IN THE HONOURABLE CHANCERY
OF THE SOVEREIGN KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
Case No.: 7
Objection to Entreaty to Amend Complaint


Your Honors,


The Crown objects to this Entreaty to Amend the Complaint on the grounds of procedure.

The General Court Rules and Procedures are quite clear: "At anytime during the course of discovery, the plaintiff or the Crown may amend their Complaint" in terms of Parties, Facts, Claims and Prayers for Relief. See §II (3) General Court Rules and Procedures, 2025. The fact of the matter that Discovery lapsed yesterday as per the Honorable SmallFries post. The Plaintiff cannot amend their complaint any longer.


Respectfully submitted,
Stephen W. Spooner Jr.
Solicitor General.

The Crown is correct regarding this procedural matter; we rescind our Entreaty to Amend Complaint.


Respectfully submitted,
Capt B. Numbers
Plaintiff's Counsel

 

[Capt11543]

IN THE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
BRIEF REGARDING ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

Further, I am concerned upon second review that this suit may not be within the jurisdiction of the Chancery of Alexandria. To that end, I order the same named above to submit, within seventy-two hours, a brief explaining why their claim is within this court's jurisdiction: "Constitutional questions, including the interpretation and application of the Constitution, as well as disputed returns arising from elections, including challenges to election results and qualifications of elected members of Parliament." K.A. Const. Part III, § 15. See also ComplexKing v. Crown of Alexandria, Case 2 (Ch. 2026).

Your Honors, Plaintiffs reassert that this case's proper venue is the Chancery, pursuant to this Court's original jurisdiction over electoral questions.


I. CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS

Plaintiffs seek to direct the Court's attention to the chain of Constitutional and statutory authorities which grant it that original jurisdiction.

K. A. Const. Part III, §15 names "constitutional questions, including the interpretation and application of the Constitution, as well as disputed returns arising from elections, including challenges to election results and qualifications of elected members of Parliament" as matters over which the Chancery has "exclusive jurisdiction." The phrase "exclusive jurisdiction" in that article is key: it designates the named categories as categories over which no other Court may have jurisdiction; it does not preclude the Court from hearing any other kind of case in the first instance.

Further down,  id at §16 makes it clear that the Chancery's original jurisdiction may be expanded by statute (emphasis added by Plaintiff's Counsel):

The Magistrates Court shall have jurisdiction over all criminal and civil matters, except those explicitly reserved for the Chancery by this Constitution or other specific laws. All cases shall initially be heard in the Magistrates Court, unless otherwise specified by law or granted special leave by the Chancery.

II. STATUTORY GRANT OF JURISDICTION

Under Article 16, Parliament has the option to expand the original jurisdiction of the Chancery beyond the categories explicitly named in the Constitution through statute. Parliament went on to use that authority when it passed A.P. 01-044 | Government Organization Act §21(1), which provides, in part, that "The Chancery Court shall have original jurisdiction over questions solely of a constitutional nature, as well as electoral questions." This sentence is surprisingly dense and worth examining carefully.

The statute names two categories of jurisdiction which clearly parallel the categories named in the Constitution, but each has a different relationship with its Constitutional counterpart. On Constitutional questions, Parliament chose to simply restate the Constitution: "questions solely of a constitutional nature" (id.) cannot reasonably read as more broad than "constitutional questions, including the interpretation and application of the Constitution" (K. A. Const. Part III §15). Crucially, however, Parliament did not choose more narrow and specific language to mirror the Constitution's highly narrow and specific named category of "disputed returns arising from elections, including challenges to election results and qualifications of elected members of Parliament." (id.) Instead, Parliament chose to name the much more broad and inclusive category of "electoral questions" (A.P. 01-044 §21(1)). It also chose to specify that "electoral questions" fall under the Chancery's "original jurisdiction". (id.) Each active clause of that particular sentence traces back to an authority granted to Parliament under Article 16 of the Constitution.


III. IS THIS AN ELECTORAL QUESTION?

Because the Government Organization Act did not provide a specific definition for the term "electoral question", that definition is left up to the Court's interpretation. Plaintiffs contend that an "electoral question" is any dispute arising from the application of electoral law. This definition would include not only the Constitutionally-guaranteed matters of exclusive jurisdiction, but also disputes over election scheduling, candidate qualifications, physical conditions within the polling place, etc. We do not ask the Court to rule that any dispute which incidentally involves an election counts as an electoral question.

In this case, the Court will determine whether or not a special election should have been held under the surrounding circumstances, and we believe that fact alone supplies the answer. This is plainly a dispute with the application of electoral law at its heart. It is an electoral question, and the Chancery has competent jurisdiction to hear it in the first instance.


IV. COMPLEXKING V. CROWN IS NOT CONTROLLING PRECEDENT

Since the Court has referenced it in its order, we wish to address ComplexKing v. Crown, Case 2 (Ch. 2026) directly. While the Court did question its original jurisdiction over that case, and it did later dismiss that case, it should be stated plainly that the dismissal was largely unrelated to the original question. The Plaintiff in that case declined to answer the jurisdiction question, and later refiled in the Magistrates' Court, of their own volition and absent any order or opinion of this Court compelling them to do so. The Court opted to "take that as no answer" and dismissed the case "for want of prosecution" (id. at #4), rather than over any jurisdictional issue.

Plaintiffs in this case believe that we have made the clear statutory argument for why this case belongs in the Chancery. We also believe that said argument should answer the question definitively, without requiring any inquiry into case law. However, setting aside the statutes, and in light of the above paragraph, Plaintiffs strongly believe that ComplexKing should not be viewed as an answer in either direction regarding this Court's jurisdiction over this case. The plaintiffs in ComplexKing denied the Court the opportunity to definitively rule on the underlying question by declining to answer it. To the extent that ComplexKing can supply precedent for this case, it dictates that a case may be dismissed when a Plaintiff abandons it. We have not abandoned our case.


Respectfully submitted,
Capt B. Numbers
Plaintiff's Counsel

 

[Capt11543]

IN THE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
ENTREATY FOR CONTINUANCE

IN THE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
ENTREATY FOR CONTINUANCE


Your Honors, the Plaintiffs have assigned new counsel (me) to this case in order to effectuate a change in strategy.

To be clear: we wish to rescind our request to waive our opening statement.

Plaintiff's Counsel also requests continuance such that the opening statement deadline falls 72 hours from this post.


Respectfully submitted,
Capt B. Numbers
Plaintiff's Counsel

Spoiler: Proof of Representation

View attachment 2435

Your Honors,

Plaintiffs seek an additional 24 hours of continuance on top of the continuance requested previously, as we must now respond to the Crown's Entreaty to Dismiss (Alliance 25 / The Greens for Alexandria v. Crown of Alexandria, Case VII (Ch. 2026) #24) as well as submit an opening statement.


Respectfully submitted,
Capt B. Numbers
Plaintiffs Counsel

 

[Smallfries]

The Crown is correct regarding this procedural matter; we rescind our Entreaty to Amend Complaint.


Respectfully submitted,
Capt B. Numbers
Plaintiff's Counsel

Acknowledged.

IN THE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
ENTREATY FOR CONTINUANCE



Your Honors,

Plaintiffs seek an additional 24 hours of continuance on top of the continuance requested previously, as we must now respond to the Crown's Entreaty to Dismiss (Alliance 25 / The Greens for Alexandria v. Crown of Alexandria, Case VII (Ch. 2026) #24) as well as submit an opening statement.


Respectfully submitted,
Capt B. Numbers
Plaintiffs Counsel

I'll extend the deadline to forty-eight hours from the original deadline as I read the brief.

 

[Capt11543]

IN THE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
RESPONSE TO ENTREATY TO DISMISS

IN THE HONOURABLE CHANCERY
OF THE SOVEREIGN KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
Case No.: 7
Entreaty to Dismiss


Your Honor,

The Crown moves to dismiss the legal fees claim in this case, as well as their entire case, on the grounds that there is a lack of claim, with prejudice.

First and foremost, in terms of legal fees, the official response of the Plaintiff was:


I find this to be a frivolous claim. The initial filing of the case the Plaintiff mentioned, noted that the £2000 legal fees was "to reflect the services rendered by MikamiLaw in its legal representation of the Plaintiff" See SoggehToast v. Crown, Case VI (Ch. 2026). To quote the Honorable Justice SmallFries earlier in this case: "Are you saying you have nothing to substantiate that number? You just made it up?" See Alliance 25 / The Greens for Alexandria v. Crown of Alexandria, Case VII (Ch. 2026)

Your honors, I believe the answer to that question is yes.

The facts of the matter for the "legal fees" are as follows:

1. MikamiLaw is not representing Plaintiff
2. The Plaintiff cannot produce any receipts from on or before filing the case for the £2000
3. The Plaintiff literally just took a random number from another case's legal fees just because they could

Therefore, we ask the Court to dismiss the Plaintiff's claim for legal fees.


Furthermore, the entire claim of the Plaintiff rests on the claim that they were "blatantly deprived of their right to contest a special election as a political party". And the fact that they were "blatantly deprived" or deprived of an right to contest the election is not in the facts section of their filling.

Please note, that in their entire filing there are no references to what "right to contest a special election" was violated, either in the Law or the Constitution. I would assume such a right would exist in one of those places, and it is ultimately up to the original filer of the case to present those rights as facts to be inspected, selected, contested, erected, disputed and refuted in a Court of Law.

They have not shown or given reference to what right of their was violated, just generally with a wave of the hand and magic pixie dust that such a thing was.

I believe that the Courtroom, and especially the Courtroom of the Chancery of Alexandria, is not a place for mere assumptions and assertations. It is a place for dialectical battle of the truth of facts.

Given that all their facts and evidence show is that allegedly it took awhile to appoint a Member of Parliament, and they do not specify what right or law was violated that guarantees their "right to contest a special election", we ask the Court to dismiss this case with the highest amount of prejudice one can muster.


Respectfully submitted,
Stephen W. Spooner Jr.
Solicitor General.

Your Honors, Plaintiffs vehemently oppose the Crown's Entreaty to Dismiss.

Plaintiffs unfortunately cannot contest the facts surrounding the prayer for reimbursement of legal fees. However, the Crown has packaged its request to dismiss said prayer with a weaker, and far more dangerous, request to throw out the Plaintiff's entire case. The Crown is, in effect, trying to claim that we lack standing to bring this case; however, they ask this Court to apply a standard that no Court or statute has ever recognized.

In the absence of any Constitutional or statutory provisions, the controlling standard for standing recognized by the General Court Rules and Procedures (Judiciary of Alexandria, 2025). It is a two-part test which is described as follows:

9) Standing Application
In order for a plaintiff to pursue a case, they must show the following to the court:

• Suffered some injury caused by a clear second party; is affected by an application of law; or has a genuine interest as a citizen and there are no reasonable and effective alternative means to challenge the law.
• Remedy is applicable under relevant law that can be granted by a favourable decision.

The first element requires a Plaintiff to satisfy one of three motivations for filing suit. Ours is the second listed: we have been affected by an application of the Alexandrian Electoral Act. On the second element, Alexandrian jurisprudence shows several examples of Courts granting procedural relief to address harms caused by misapplication of electoral law (see SoggehToast v. Crown, Case VI (2026); Entreaty of Removal for Case 3 (Mag. Ct., 2026)). There is ample reason to conclude that this Court could order the removal of the appointed MP and order a special election if it deems their appointment unlawful. Notably, upon reviewing the sentence structure, the clause regarding "reasonable and effective alternative means to challenge the law" does not apply to the "affected by an application of law" list item, meaning that a party that has been "affected by an application of law" always has standing to sue (as long as the second element is also satisfied), regardless of what other options may be available to them.

It is clear that this claim satisfies the GCRP's standing requirements, but the Crown would rather this Court adopt a brand-new standard pulled from thin air. The Crown contends that a Plaintiff must name some explicitly enumerated right which was violated by the government in order to file suit against it in this Court. However, not only is that simply not the legal standard, it sets up a patently unjust system in which the government may get away with breaking the law as long as nobody's fundamental rights are injured.

The Crown is indeed obligated to uphold each person's fundamental rights, but that is far from the only obligation that the Crown owes to the people. In fact, the Crown binds itself to uphold additional obligations through statute quite frequently. For instance, the Crown is obligated to transmit exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants (see A.P. 04-019 | Criminal Procedure Act §16(2)(a)); it is obligated to provide adequate notice to players subject to eviction (see A.P. 01-041 | Real Property Rules Consolidation Act §9(1)); it is obligated to turn over unclassified documents upon request (see A.P. 02-001 | Freedom of Information Act §6(6)(a)). Failure to meet those obligations itself harms the individuals on the other end of the violation for any number of case-specific reasons, but also for the fact that the people ought to be able to trust that the government will follow its own laws.

A.P. 00-018 | Alexandrian Electoral Act §11(1) is yet another obligation that the Crown bound itself to uphold:

In the event of a vacancy in Parliament, if Parliament cannot agree on a replacement within 72 hours, a Special Election shall be held.

This is no "magic pixie dust", it is not discretionary. It is a procedure that the crown is obligated to follow. Yet, in this case, there was a vacancy that lasted over 72 hours with no special election whatsoever. The Crown breaching the obligation to follow the legally mandated procedure, and filling the vacancy by means they no longer legally had access to, is itself harmful. It breaks the trust between the people, including the Plaintiff, and the government; it denies any person or party seeking representation in Parliament a legal pathway to reach that goal; and it denies the people at large the ability to be represented by a full and active legislature for as long as the procedure designed to uphold that ability is not followed.

If this Court finds in favor of the Crown and dismisses this case, it would be a grave miscarriage of justice. It would be giving the Crown leave to break its own laws, at its own discretion, as long as it does not go so far as to break someone's fundamental rights. We believe that the bar for accountability should be, and is, far lower than that.


Respectfully submitted,
Capt B. Numbers
Plaintiff's Counsel

 

[Capt11543]

IN THE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
OPENING STATEMENT


Your Honors, this is a simple case with a plain outcome. The parties agree on the facts: a vacancy in Parliament opened on July 20, and was filled on July 31, over 10 days later. The parties even agree that the law requires a Special Election to be held at some point. The narrow disagreement before the Court is this: when should the Special Election have been held, if at all?


I. WHAT THE LAW ACTUALLY SAYS

The controlling statute is A.P. 00-018 | Alexandrian Electoral Act §11(1), which reads in full:

(1) In the event of a vacancy in Parliament, if Parliament cannot agree on a replacement within 72 hours, a Special Election shall be held.

(a) If Parliament has been convened for 77 days or longer, or a General Election is scheduled within two weeks of the vacancy opening, a Special Election will not be called, and the seat shall remain vacant for the remainder of the term.​

We note that the vacancy at issue in this case did not occur within the exclusion window set forth in subsection (a), so that subsection does not directly apply.

The statute is clear that the Special Election must be held within 72 hours of some specified event; but which one? We contend that the most reasonable answer by far is that the specified event is the moment the seat becomes vacant. The whole text of §11(1) is framed around that event only; no other event is named there. The text of paragraph (a) also explicitly states that a general election must not be scheduled “within two weeks of the vacancy opening”; in effect, this clause restates the trigger from the opening of subsection (1) in a clause which modifies the application of subsection (1).

A similarly constructed clause appears at id. at §10(3) and governs the filling of vacant seats specifically following a general election (which also does not apply in this case):

(3) Parties who control vacant seats shall appoint a citizen to fill each vacancy no less than 14 days after the results of the general election are announced. After 14 days, a special election shall be held to fill any seats which are still vacant.

(a) This 14-day deadline shall supersede any other statutory deadline for filling vacant seats.​

Both clauses name a specific, triggering event relating to vacant Parliamentary seats (after an election vs. a mid-term vacancy), and both set forth a temporal deadline after which a special election must be called (14 days vs. 7 hours).

We believe that this Court ought to recognize the pattern in these clauses, and to view each of them as part of a coherent scheme designed to be self-similar. The consistent framing of each temporal deadline as relative to the opening of a vacancy points to the fact that the text “within 72 hours”, as it appears in §11(1), should be interpreted to mean “within 72 hours of the seat becoming vacant”.


II. THE CROWN’S VIEW

The Crown, on the other hand, would have this Court take a view that requires adding an extra triggering condition that appears nowhere in the text, and furthermore completely defeats itself.

In their Answer to Complaint (Alliance 25 / The Greens for Alexandria v. Crown of Alexandria, Case VII (Ch. 2026) #6), the Crown suggests that “Parliament has to engage actively in the process of trying to find a replacement and disagree.” The Crown asserts that a procedural call for a nomination must take place, and that such an event never took place in this case. In fact, such a procedural action is not required by any statute or Parliamentary rule. As previously discussed, the statute which governs this situation is clear, and it does not require the Speaker to manually intervene. In every other instance where a Parliament seat has gone vacant, a nomination has been issued, voted on, and accepted well within the 72-hour deadline. This is a matter of public record.

Not only is the Crown’s position unsubstantiated by statute, but it is completely self-defeating. The clear intent for this provision’s existence is to ensure that the people's chamber is full of representatives working on their behalf for as much of the term as possible. It exists to ensure that the parties cannot continuously cling to control over seats that they cannot fill. The immediate trigger upon the seat becoming vacant, and the short time frame of 72 hours to avoid a Special Election, are designed for this purpose. Under the Crown's view, on the other hand, the 72-hour time frame opens only when an unspecified, formal procedure begins. However, there is no enforcement mechanism to ensure that this happens at all, let alone in anything resembling a prompt and timely manner. The Speaker of Parliament may delay the appointment process for any length of time and for any reason, even if they simply “don’t think Parliament has had enough time to agree or disagree on a replacement” (P-003). It is absurd to suggest that Parliament intended to create an enforcement mechanism with such an easy out.

In light of the potential consequences, and the existence of a far more reasonable conclusion which is grounded in the statute, Plaintiffs implore the Court not to adopt the Crown’s legal theory of this case.


Respectfully submitted,
Capt B. Numbers
Plaintiff's Counsel

 

[Smallfries]

I'll extend the deadline to forty-eight hours from the original deadline as I read the brief.

Update: we have not forgotten, this is second on my to-do list within the Chancery. Apologies for the wait. Nothing is due in the meantime.

 

[Smallfries]

Further, I am concerned upon second review that this suit may not be within the jurisdiction of the Chancery of Alexandria. To that end, I order the same named above to submit, within seventy-two hours, a brief explaining why their claim is within this court's jurisdiction: "Constitutional questions, including the interpretation and application of the Constitution, as well as disputed returns arising from elections, including challenges to election results and qualifications of elected members of Parliament." K.A. Const. Part III, § 15. See also ComplexKing v. Crown of Alexandria, Case 2 (Ch. 2026).

Writ of Court

IN THE CHANCERY OF
THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA

WRIT - DISMISSAL

---

In the current controversy, Chancellor Chips made note of a potential flaw in the jurisdiction of this case. At glance, the constitutional grant of original jurisdiction is simple: Only to those cases which consider constitutional questions and those which concern disputed returns arising from elections.

The matter at hand regards neither. In their jurisdictional statement, Claimant does not use either of the original constitutional hooks for the Chancery, and does not seem to directly contest the fact that this case does not fall under either of those stated hooks.

Instead, Claimant relies upon a provision of the Constitution that has thus far gone unnoticed, as far as we can tell. Under the jurisdictional section for the Magistrates Court, it is written that "[the court] shall have jurisdiction over all criminal and civil matters, except those explicitly reserved for the Chancery by this Constitution or other specific laws. All cases shall initially be heard in the Magistrates Court, unless otherwise specified by law." K.A. Const. Part III, § 16 (FriesLaw, 5/22/26) (emphasis added).

Relying upon this clause, Claimant points to a post-foundational Act of Parliament that allegedly uses this clause. A.P. 01-044 | Government Organization Act ("GOA"). In this act, it is written that the jurisdiction of this Court shall be "over questions solely of a constitutional nature, as well as electoral questions." Id. at Part IV, § 21(1). The key difference pointed to is the constitutional wording versus the statutory wording—that the former's "electoral question" is broader than "disputed returns arising from elections."

Of course, this seems valid prima facie as a line of argumentation. In effect, all jurisdiction is granted to the judiciary as a combined force. Of this, the jurisdiction of the Chancery is very limited in the first instance, with the totality of all remaining jurisdiction belonging to the lower court. However, Parliament may transfer to the Chancery (not eliminate entirely, it should be noted, but shift from the lower court to this one) jurisdiction from the lower court.

Is this the end of the inquiry? The reader's peripheral vision detecting more text beneath this line should suffice to say it is not.

As always, we first look to the text of the Constitution. The construction of the jurisdiction of the courts is simple: the courts have all jurisdiction in all matters. The Chancery has jurisdiction in the first instance in very specific matters: constitutional questions and disputed returns. The rest, without further intervention, is the lower court's domain.

However, the reduction clause allows Parliament to "explicitly [reserve]" jurisdiction from the lower court to the Chancery. (We know this, without lengthy explanation, because the only explicitly reserved jurisdiction—according to the text—can come from the Constitution itself or "other specific law." The only other creators of law are Parliament and this Court.) Ergo, because the GOA writes different words for the jurisdiction of the Chancery, and the wording of the electoral portion of that new jurisdiction seems broader than the Constitution's original wording, Parliament must have expanded our jurisdiction pursuant to the reduction clause, and the issue at hand may be enveloped within that new jurisdiction.

This is not an unreasonable deduction, but there are some flaws. To begin with, the particular era of Alexandrian statecraft from whence the legislation at hand came—not to mention the Act's author—are well known for its fairly poor craftsmanship and less-than-magnificent understanding of the Kingdom's legal posture. See generally Ayatha v. Rex, Case 6, § 2 (Ch. 2025). This era—and the author—was known for its brash over-reach and unfounded demands for "Parliamentary Supremacy," a now-defunct and toothless view that argued, in essence, that Parliament was the supreme body of state in all affairs. See Ref. Rights Collective v. Crown of Alexandria, Case 11 (Ch. 2025) (ruling against the Crown after the Crown explicitly endorsed the idea of Parliamentary Supremacy, directly invoking the author of the above act); P.S. 01-001 | Resolution on Parliamentary Supremacy (rejected) (Parliamentary resolution endorsing Parliamentary resolution, authored by the same as the Act above, being rejected). It is from this view, and many more examples, that we and all who have eyes to see may know that there is something of a warning sign to any legal document from this period, from this author.

From this vantage point of caution, we spot one more glaring red flag. We agree that it is possible to effectively amend the Constitution (at least to this specific topic) with mere statute—a majority vote. However, such a thing cannot be taken lightly. This Act (and the act on the same topic preceding it), instead of having a great wealth of discussion regarding something so major as amending the Constitution and assigning jurisdiction of the courts, has no related discussion at all. See P.B.01-010 Debate (Three substantive posts, one congratulating the author for working hard, one saying "yes," and one from the author outlining that it seeks to "give [the judiciary] extensive powers."); P.B.01-044 Debate (Three substantive posts of debate, none of which discuss judicial jurisdiction. Two posts discuss the judiciary in the context of the belief that Parliament is the sole arbitrator of internal affairs, a now-disproven cause. Dartanboy v. Crown of Alexandria, Case 1 (Ch. 2026)).

Should we truly assume without debate or hesitation that this Parliament from this era, or even the above-maligned author of the bill, truly meant to act so massively as to change the explicitly written order of the Constitution as to judicial jurisdiction without so much as a throwaway sentence mentioning it? The change originates with an older act (as the GOA is little more than a consolidation of this originating act, inter alia) and there too neither author nor Parliament gives any reasoning or indication explaining or acknowledging the potential massive change Claimant charges they wrought. See id.; A.P. 01-010 | The Judiciary Act.

The power to effectively amend the Constitution with a majority of Parliament is a worrying and highly abusable power indeed. We cannot accept that it was done on a whim, with not a single individual commenting on the matter or mentioning it as intended. What is far more likely, given the well-known understanding of this era and the Acts' author, is instead that a poorly-phrased piece of legislation slipped through the cracks. Within those Acts was a turn of phrase in the jurisdiction for the Chancery that, while indeed distinct from the original jurisdiction in the Constitution, was far more likely to be a mistake or unconscious re-write to make the clause sound "better" in the author's mind.

Further, the language of the clause in the act itself grants credence to the thought that the wording change was one of absent-mindedness. As Claimant notes themselves, the first portion of the jurisdiction regarding constitutional questions is not expanded, and very likely remains unchanged, despite different wording. Why must the second portion be any different? Is it impossible that the author made a mistake? If nothing else, look to the lower court's jurisdiction. The Magistrate Court, both in the Constitution and in the GOA, has original jurisdiction over "all civil matters." However, in the GOA, the author further grants the Magistrate Court appellate jurisdiction over "the adjudication of all freedom of information requests."

From where may an individual appeal? All jurisdiction in this Realm, as noted supra, is vested in one of the two article three courts. The Magistrates Court is surely not hearing an appeal from the Chancery, and there are no other courts in Alexandria. The words "appellate jurisdiction" are very explicit, and imply an appeals process from a lower court. There exists none. If a freedom of information request is denied, would any action a concerned individual may take not fall already under the lower court's "original jurisdiction over all civil matters"? We see no reason why not. Thus, this clause too is a clear error on the behalf of the author, an unnecessary, ineffectual, and worthless addendum to an already over-crowded and over-complicated document.

Given the general understanding of this era and this author, neighboring dual concerns with the quality (or even validity) of the clause in question, as well as the distinct lack of public debate, comment, or even statutory section acknowledging the intent, desire, or fact of changing jurisdiction, we find it is much more likely here that the offending section is little more than a typo—the poor drafting mistake of an over-eager and over-ambitious legislator that did not think before he typed. If nothing else, the fact that this clause would effectively amend the Constitution without public referendum or a supermajority of Parliament demands the grandest of scrutiny. Without being absolutely clear that Parliament indeed intended to effectively amend the Constitution, we find the suggestion to allow what may just as likely (if not more) be a drafting error to wholly change our Constitution grotesque in form. Mere insinuation may never amend the Constitution, especially in a case like this—Parliament's extraordinarily express will and intent must be evident. As it stands, sections twenty-one and twenty-three of the GOA do not amend the Constitution in any formal or effective way, and as they stand do not clearly serve to exercise Parliament's abilities under the reduction clause of the Constitution.

However, this still does not conclude our inquiry. Were we still to assume the GOA intended to alter the jurisdiction, an issue remains. The above discussion regarding the validity of assuming that Parliament, in passing this oddly-drafted legislation, clearly intended to in effect amend the Constitution is a tangled, branching, and confusing trench to plow through, muddy and lethargic at its core. The Chancery, ever the valiant knight, can act as Alexander once did and cut through this Gordian Knot.

To put things simply: The initial original jurisdiction of this court is constitutional questions and disputed returns arising from elections. The reduction clause allows judicial jurisdiction reserved to the lower court—all criminal and civil matters—to be taken from that court and transferred here. Does there exist any limits to this power?

We hold that there is. While clear that Parliament may transfer matters from the lower court to the Chancery, it may not render (especially by mere statute) any provision of the Constitution to mere surplusage. See .FreakyyyyBob158 v. Crown of Alexandria, Case 5 (Ch. 2026) (". . . law should not be reduced to mere surplusage . . . we disdain surplusage, and cannot hold [that as valid]."). To statutorily amend the Constitution in this manner and expand the jurisdiction of the Chancery in either of the two specific topics the Constitution expressly forbids would do so, and thus cannot be allowed. We find it clear that as to these two fields, the Constitution expressly desires this Court to stand where it is and nowhere else.

Parliament may assign original jurisdiction from the lower court to us in any other matter. Should they determine we must hear all cases regarding taxes, or family crest disputes, or property disputes involving livestock living near marble columns, they may do so. But Parliament may not render the specific language of the Constitution moot by altering, in any manner, the Chancery's jurisdiction regarding "constitutional questions, including the interpretation and application of the Constitution, as well as disputed returns arising from elections, including challenges to election results and qualifications of [candidates]."

Thus, were we to find that the intent of Parliament in passing the GOA was indeed to alter our jurisdiction as Claimant described, we would have no choice but to strike down as unconstitutional the entirety of those provisions regarding the jurisdiction of the Chancery and Magistrate courts both.

Instead, we find that the magnitude of the alleged change is so great, and the likelihood (given all available evidence and the totality of the circumstances) so small, that no reasonable jurist could give credence to the allegation that Parliament clearly and obviously meant to effectively amend the Constitution, and the forum of decision, in the way alleged.

Therefore, we find that this lawsuit has been improperly filed, and issue a Writ of Dismissal for want of jurisdiction.

We understand this will surely come as frustrating to Claimant, and likely to the Crown as well should Claimant decide to re-file with the Magistrates Court. Though we see this likely annoyance and are sympathetic to it, here the law binds us to be beholden to jurisdiction and ensure the proper allocation of caseload. However, as to one concern—Claimant's likely concern regarding statutes of limitations—we rule in equity and hold that generally, as a matter of fairness and justice, statutes of limitations run only from their beginning to when a lawsuit is filed in good faith. Though the suit here was improper, we have no reason to believe it was in poor faith, and hold that the clock stopped the day this action was filed, and starts up again today.

We thank all parties for their time and efforts.