Lawsuit: Dismissed Alliance 25 / The Greens for Alexandria v. Crown of Alexandria, Case VII (2026)

Writ of Court

IN THE CHANCERY OF
THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA

WRIT - DISMISSAL

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In the current controversy, Chancellor Chips made note of a potential flaw in the jurisdiction of this case. At glance, the constitutional grant of original jurisdiction is simple: Only to those cases which consider constitutional questions and those which concern disputed returns arising from elections.

The matter at hand regards neither. In their jurisdictional statement, Claimant does not use either of the original constitutional hooks for the Chancery, and does not seem to directly contest the fact that this case does not fall under either of those stated hooks.

Instead, Claimant relies upon a provision of the Constitution that has thus far gone unnoticed, as far as we can tell. Under the jurisdictional section for the Magistrates Court, it is written that "[the court] shall have jurisdiction over all criminal and civil matters, except those explicitly reserved for the Chancery by this Constitution or other specific laws. All cases shall initially be heard in the Magistrates Court, unless otherwise specified by law." K.A. Const. Part III, § 16 (FriesLaw, 5/22/26) (emphasis added).

Relying upon this clause, Claimant points to a post-foundational Act of Parliament that allegedly uses this clause. A.P. 01-044 | Government Organization Act ("GOA"). In this act, it is written that the jurisdiction of this Court shall be "over questions solely of a constitutional nature, as well as electoral questions." Id. at Part IV, § 21(1). The key difference pointed to is the constitutional wording versus the statutory wording—that the former's "electoral question" is broader than "disputed returns arising from elections."

Of course, this seems valid prima facie as a line of argumentation. In effect, all jurisdiction is granted to the judiciary as a combined force. Of this, the jurisdiction of the Chancery is very limited in the first instance, with the totality of all remaining jurisdiction belonging to the lower court. However, Parliament may transfer to the Chancery (not eliminate entirely, it should be noted, but shift from the lower court to this one) jurisdiction from the lower court.

Is this the end of the inquiry? The reader's peripheral vision detecting more text beneath this line should suffice to say it is not.

As always, we first look to the text of the Constitution. The construction of the jurisdiction of the courts is simple: the courts have all jurisdiction in all matters. The Chancery has jurisdiction in the first instance in very specific matters: constitutional questions and disputed returns. The rest, without further intervention, is the lower court's domain.

However, the reduction clause allows Parliament to "explicitly [reserve]" jurisdiction from the lower court to the Chancery. (We know this, without lengthy explanation, because the only explicitly reserved jurisdiction—according to the text—can come from the Constitution itself or "other specific law." The only other creators of law are Parliament and this Court.) Ergo, because the GOA writes different words for the jurisdiction of the Chancery, and the wording of the electoral portion of that new jurisdiction seems broader than the Constitution's original wording, Parliament must have expanded our jurisdiction pursuant to the reduction clause, and the issue at hand may be enveloped within that new jurisdiction.

This is not an unreasonable deduction, but there are some flaws. To begin with, the particular era of Alexandrian statecraft from whence the legislation at hand came—not to mention the Act's author—are well known for its fairly poor craftsmanship and less-than-magnificent understanding of the Kingdom's legal posture. See generally Ayatha v. Rex, Case 6, § 2 (Ch. 2025). This era—and the author—was known for its brash over-reach and unfounded demands for "Parliamentary Supremacy," a now-defunct and toothless view that argued, in essence, that Parliament was the supreme body of state in all affairs. See Ref. Rights Collective v. Crown of Alexandria, Case 11 (Ch. 2025) (ruling against the Crown after the Crown explicitly endorsed the idea of Parliamentary Supremacy, directly invoking the author of the above act); P.S. 01-001 | Resolution on Parliamentary Supremacy (rejected) (Parliamentary resolution endorsing Parliamentary resolution, authored by the same as the Act above, being rejected). It is from this view, and many more examples, that we and all who have eyes to see may know that there is something of a warning sign to any legal document from this period, from this author.

From this vantage point of caution, we spot one more glaring red flag. We agree that it is possible to effectively amend the Constitution (at least to this specific topic) with mere statute—a majority vote. However, such a thing cannot be taken lightly. This Act (and the act on the same topic preceding it), instead of having a great wealth of discussion regarding something so major as amending the Constitution and assigning jurisdiction of the courts, has no related discussion at all. See P.B.01-010 Debate (Three substantive posts, one congratulating the author for working hard, one saying "yes," and one from the author outlining that it seeks to "give [the judiciary] extensive powers."); P.B.01-044 Debate (Three substantive posts of debate, none of which discuss judicial jurisdiction. Two posts discuss the judiciary in the context of the belief that Parliament is the sole arbitrator of internal affairs, a now-disproven cause. Dartanboy v. Crown of Alexandria, Case 1 (Ch. 2026)).

Should we truly assume without debate or hesitation that this Parliament from this era, or even the above-maligned author of the bill, truly meant to act so massively as to change the explicitly written order of the Constitution as to judicial jurisdiction without so much as a throwaway sentence mentioning it? The change originates with an older act (as the GOA is little more than a consolidation of this originating act, inter alia) and there too neither author nor Parliament gives any reasoning or indication explaining or acknowledging the potential massive change Claimant charges they wrought. See id.; A.P. 01-010 | The Judiciary Act.

The power to effectively amend the Constitution with a majority of Parliament is a worrying and highly abusable power indeed. We cannot accept that it was done on a whim, with not a single individual commenting on the matter or mentioning it as intended. What is far more likely, given the well-known understanding of this era and the Acts' author, is instead that a poorly-phrased piece of legislation slipped through the cracks. Within those Acts was a turn of phrase in the jurisdiction for the Chancery that, while indeed distinct from the original jurisdiction in the Constitution, was far more likely to be a mistake or unconscious re-write to make the clause sound "better" in the author's mind.

Further, the language of the clause in the act itself grants credence to the thought that the wording change was one of absent-mindedness. As Claimant notes themselves, the first portion of the jurisdiction regarding constitutional questions is not expanded, and very likely remains unchanged, despite different wording. Why must the second portion be any different? Is it impossible that the author made a mistake? If nothing else, look to the lower court's jurisdiction. The Magistrate Court, both in the Constitution and in the GOA, has original jurisdiction over "all civil matters." However, in the GOA, the author further grants the Magistrate Court appellate jurisdiction over "the adjudication of all freedom of information requests."

From where may an individual appeal? All jurisdiction in this Realm, as noted supra, is vested in one of the two article three courts. The Magistrates Court is surely not hearing an appeal from the Chancery, and there are no other courts in Alexandria. The words "appellate jurisdiction" are very explicit, and imply an appeals process from a lower court. There exists none. If a freedom of information request is denied, would any action a concerned individual may take not fall already under the lower court's "original jurisdiction over all civil matters"? We see no reason why not. Thus, this clause too is a clear error on the behalf of the author, an unnecessary, ineffectual, and worthless addendum to an already over-crowded and over-complicated document.

Given the general understanding of this era and this author, neighboring dual concerns with the quality (or even validity) of the clause in question, as well as the distinct lack of public debate, comment, or even statutory section acknowledging the intent, desire, or fact of changing jurisdiction, we find it is much more likely here that the offending section is little more than a typo—the poor drafting mistake of an over-eager and over-ambitious legislator that did not think before he typed. If nothing else, the fact that this clause would effectively amend the Constitution without public referendum or a supermajority of Parliament demands the grandest of scrutiny. Without being absolutely clear that Parliament indeed intended to effectively amend the Constitution, we find the suggestion to allow what may just as likely (if not more) be a drafting error to wholly change our Constitution grotesque in form. Mere insinuation may never amend the Constitution, especially in a case like this—Parliament's extraordinarily express will and intent must be evident. As it stands, sections twenty-one and twenty-three of the GOA do not amend the Constitution in any formal or effective way, and as they stand do not clearly serve to exercise Parliament's abilities under the reduction clause of the Constitution.

However, this still does not conclude our inquiry. Were we still to assume the GOA intended to alter the jurisdiction, an issue remains. The above discussion regarding the validity of assuming that Parliament, in passing this oddly-drafted legislation, clearly intended to in effect amend the Constitution is a tangled, branching, and confusing trench to plow through, muddy and lethargic at its core. The Chancery, ever the valiant knight, can act as Alexander once did and cut through this Gordian Knot.

To put things simply: The initial original jurisdiction of this court is constitutional questions and disputed returns arising from elections. The reduction clause allows judicial jurisdiction reserved to the lower court—all criminal and civil matters—to be taken from that court and transferred here. Does there exist any limits to this power?

We hold that there is. While clear that Parliament may transfer matters from the lower court to the Chancery, it may not render (especially by mere statute) any provision of the Constitution to mere surplusage. See .FreakyyyyBob158 v. Crown of Alexandria, Case 5 (Ch. 2026) (". . . law should not be reduced to mere surplusage . . . we disdain surplusage, and cannot hold [that as valid]."). To statutorily amend the Constitution in this manner and expand the jurisdiction of the Chancery in either of the two specific topics the Constitution expressly forbids would do so, and thus cannot be allowed. We find it clear that as to these two fields, the Constitution expressly desires this Court to stand where it is and nowhere else.

Parliament may assign original jurisdiction from the lower court to us in any other matter. Should they determine we must hear all cases regarding taxes, or family crest disputes, or property disputes involving livestock living near marble columns, they may do so. But Parliament may not render the specific language of the Constitution moot by altering, in any manner, the Chancery's jurisdiction regarding "constitutional questions, including the interpretation and application of the Constitution, as well as disputed returns arising from elections, including challenges to election results and qualifications of [candidates]."

Thus, were we to find that the intent of Parliament in passing the GOA was indeed to alter our jurisdiction as Claimant described, we would have no choice but to strike down as unconstitutional the entirety of those provisions regarding the jurisdiction of the Chancery and Magistrate courts both.

Instead, we find that the magnitude of the alleged change is so great, and the likelihood (given all available evidence and the totality of the circumstances) so small, that no reasonable jurist could give credence to the allegation that Parliament clearly and obviously meant to effectively amend the Constitution, and the forum of decision, in the way alleged.

Therefore, we find that this lawsuit has been improperly filed, and issue a Writ of Dismissal for want of jurisdiction.

We understand this will surely come as frustrating to Claimant, and likely to the Crown as well should Claimant decide to re-file with the Magistrates Court. Though we see this likely annoyance and are sympathetic to it, here the law binds us to be beholden to jurisdiction and ensure the proper allocation of caseload. However, as to one concern—Claimant's likely concern regarding statutes of limitations—we rule in equity and hold that generally, as a matter of fairness and justice, statutes of limitations run only from their beginning to when a lawsuit is filed in good faith. Though the suit here was improper, we have no reason to believe it was in poor faith, and hold that the clock stopped the day this action was filed, and starts up again today.

We thank all parties for their time and efforts.