Lawsuit: In Session Ameslap v. Crown, Case 12 (Ch. 2025)

[Smallfries]

Discovery has concluded at this time. Claimant shall have seventy-two hours to produce their opening statement.

 

[Thritystone]

My Lord, I stand present and ready to give testimony

*Edit: I swear to tell the truth, the whole trut,h and nothing but the truth, so help me end & tech

 

[ameslap]

In a 2-0 vote, the Chancery denies this witness. We do not think this witness would be useful in advancing the facts of this case.

In a 2-0 vote, the Chancery grants this witness.

In a 2-0 vote, the Chancery denies this witness. As written in a response from the bench above, the Chancery does not wish to advance spoilation of interpretation from after-the-fact discussion. The only legislative history or interpretation that shall hold any sway over judicial process is history from before the passage of a bill or act, or interpretation passed down by a court (or in the course of pre-passage legislative discussion).

The Chancery does not wish to create the impression that someone's interpretation on an act weeks or months hence has any precedential or binding power on a matter at hand.

The proposed witnesses who were denied have no explained direct relevance to the case at hand, and we hold any testimony from them at this time would be improper. This is denied.

IN THE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
ENTREATY FOR RECONSIDERATION

Your honours,

I ask that you reconsider the consequences of this decision to deny my witnesses outright. The Plaintiff believes these witnesses are crucial in determining the only fact in question:

The respondent DENIES the claim that the Applicant’s removal was unconstitutional.

If, for whatever reason, the witness testimony or questions are indeed irrelevant, then there are mechanisms for opposing counsel to object during testimony.

Furthermore, the General Court Rules and Procedures outline the protocol for witnesses described as:

A party may submit a list for witnesses at any time before the end of discovery. In order for a witness to be called during witness testimony, they must be announced under this rule, during discovery. Any witness may be objected to according to the objections laid out within the rules and procedures of the respective courts they are testifying in.

Failure to adhere to the timelines of this rule may subject that party to a contempt of court charge at the presiding judge’s decision. The presiding judge shall include a warning regarding the timeline when summoning the witness.

These rules do not say they are subject to judicial descretion, only the objection of opposing counsel, which they did not object.

The Plaintiff followed the correct procedure to call witnesses, and for the judiciary to sua sponte deny them leads to a precedent that any judicial officer may deny any witness, even when no one objects. I ask the court to allow these witnesses. The Plaintiff to build their case properly and by their own perogative, not by the perogative of the courts.

The Rules of Evidence Act
The denial based on relevancy goes against Section 8 of the RoEA. Testimony by witnesses is evidence and is relevant if it "has a tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence and the fact is a consequence in determining the action."

Under the law, the testimony of these witnesses will indeed make the fact in question more or less probable than it would be without their testimony.

Under Sec. 11 of the ROEA, Ibney is highly qualified and would be called to testify as an expert witness. He has specific technical knowledge as to the impacts of the restrictions on the plaintiff and the country at large. We would qualify him under the ROEA as required, and his testimony is highly relevant as it makes it more likely that the act is unconstitutional.

CasualGreyKnight was present and helped with the writing of the Alexandrian Constitution. Legislative intent is highly relevant to the meaning of the wording of the Constitution, and if there are two reasonable meanings to a particular word or phrase, the court should look to legislative intent when determining what the Constitution means. Because of this, CasualGreyKnight is likely to make facts more or less probable and is thus relevant.

For all of these reasons, I ask that the Chancery reconsider the witnesses.

 

[ameslap]

Discovery has concluded at this time. Claimant shall have seventy-two hours to produce their opening statement.

IN THE CHANCERY OF ALEXANDRIA
ENTREATY OF PROMPTING

Your honour, I request that the opening statement have a deadline of 72 hours after the ruling on the Entreaty of Reconsideration. This will impact the opening statements.

 

[Smallfries]

These rules do not say they are subject to judicial descretion, only the objection of opposing counsel, which they did not object.

We do not find this line of reasoning convincing. It is entirely appropriate for an entity to engage in behavior that is so basic and necessary for the elementary function of its operation even though an authorizing authority did not give explicit assent for them to do so. See Ayatha v. Rex, Case 6 at § 3(II) (Ch. 2025) (stating that "It is conceivable that an individual may undertake tasks delegated to their branch, without being given explicit permission from Parliament via statute to do so. This is not necessarily unconstitutional.")

Judicial officers must be afforded a reasonable level of discretion in the context of their proceedings, both in order to ensure fairness during judicial proceedings and to continue a workable pace of the proceedings. Where judicial officers are not explicitly commanded by statute or procedure to act in a certain way, they may use this reasonable level of discretion to conduct their proceedings in order to maintain these twin goals of fairness and speed.

Here, the authorizing statute for the rules of evidence cited by Claimant do not mandate that a judicial officer must accept any and all witnesses. So too do this court's own procedures not demand that all witnesses be accepted without any discretion from the court. Indeed, no limit on the court's discretion has been described. In acting entirely within one's own space—here, the procedures of a legal action—reasonable discretion is permissible when dealing with the assigned functions of that entity.

Any person who has worked within the government during the lifespan of our national project surely understands that having to abide strictly to specific rules that contain within them the only allowable actions does not enable efficient and practicable operation. This method of governance may be desirable in some portions of a society, but not in the judiciary. We retain the ability to make reasonable decisions as to procedure when those decisions are based in fairness, efficiency, and are not outside the bounds set by law.

To that end, the denials petitioned against above were made in the interest of efficiency.

---

The first of the denied witnesses, Ibney, was called as "a legal expert, lawmaker, and helped with the 2025 Election Results and can speak on the letter of the law." Witnesses must have a purpose, and the purpose stated for this witness is to "speak on the letter of the law." We can only assume this means that he would give his opinion as to what the law means. Claimant also states in his petition that Ibney would be an expert witness with "specific technical knowledge as to the impacts of the restrictions on the plaintiff and the country at large."

Witnesses are called to give testimony on facts of the case, and expert witnesses are called to inform the trier of fact on technical or difficult to understand matters related to the case that the trier of fact would not reasonably know. Here, the Claimant does not explain in great detail as to what exactly Ibney would testify on. While parties are not required to give exhaustive statements as to their proposed witnesses qualifications and topics of discussion—we do not seek to rigorously vet any and all witnesses proposed—in some matters we require more than a concise statement of purpose.

Witnesses may not give conclusions of law, and attorney expert witnesses may not attempt to share conclusions of interpretation or constitutionality. These three final determinations are solely the domain of the court, and may not be usurped. To have any witness attempt to give conclusions of law, attempt to share conclusions of interpretation, or discuss the constitutionality or legality of any matter is wholly inappropriate. This is, again, solely the jurisdiction of the court and no witness should ever attempt to tread beyond that line separating the judge from the parties.

Here, Ibney has been called to his stance as an attorney, former legislator, and being able to "speak on the letter of the law." It is also claimed he has some technical knowledge that is of some use. His qualifications are only relevant as to the purpose of speaking on the law, and we can only assume this action would be to tell us his interpretation on the law and how it should be administered. This is inappropriate, unhelpful, and would do nothing but waste our time, the parties' time, and the witness's time.

Further, in this case we do not foresee any technical facts or complicated workings that we could not resolve ourselves—and indeed the Claimant has not suggested any. Technical facts are not those that are specific about a law, custom, or situation, but those that are so nuanced, niche, and convoluted that an individual of reasonable intelligence would not readily know or understand. The knowledge, skill, or experience of the witness must be of a quality that their knowledge will help the trial of fact to understand the evidence presented or determine a fact that the trier otherwise could not.

The matter before us is interpretation of a law. As discussed above, interpretation is wholly within the realm of the court. The only time an expert witness should testify on interpretation is when a specific action, custom, or word has some deeper meaning behind it that a reasonable trier of fact would not be expected to understand. We did not find, and were not convinced, that this exists.

For all of those reasons above, Ibney is not a proper witness to this case. If there indeed exists some technical fact that this court could not reasonably be expected to understand, Claimant is encouraged to respond with a good-faith explanation as to what this fact is and why a reasonable trier of fact could not be expected to interpret properly without the witness's testimony on that matter.

---

Second, CasualGreyKnight is not an appropriate witness in this matter. Casual was described as "[someone who] was present [at the writing of the Constitution] and helped with the writing of the Alexandrian Constitution."

The stated purpose of this witness is to assist in giving a first-hand account of legislative history. While surely of great interest to historians and political minds, this testimony is of no value or interest in a jurisprudential context. As noted above, only the court may rule on matters of interpretation. Parties may propose or advance theories, or present evidence as to facts of the history of interpretation, but may not introduce testimony as to that interpretation.

For these reasons, CasualGreyKnight is an improper witness.

---

For all of the reasons above, the court did not abuse its discretion. The denial of the two listed witnesses were proper. The bar for a witness to be called is low, but witnesses must be relevant and must not be improper or wade into the territory of the court. Therefore we deny the writ of reconsideration.

---

IN THE CHANCERY OF ALEXANDRIA
ENTREATY OF PROMPTING

Your honour, I request that the opening statement have a deadline of 72 hours after the ruling on the Entreaty of Reconsideration. This will impact the opening statements.

Claimant is advised that a request for a writ of prompting is the improper venue for this request. Claimant instead should an entreaty of continuance.

We grant a modified writ of continuance, valued at forty-eight hours from the time of this post.

 

[ameslap]

We do not find this line of reasoning convincing. It is entirely appropriate for an entity to engage in behavior that is so basic and necessary for the elementary function of its operation even though an authorizing authority did not give explicit assent for them to do so. See Ayatha v. Rex, Case 6 at § 3(II) (Ch. 2025) (stating that "It is conceivable that an individual may undertake tasks delegated to their branch, without being given explicit permission from Parliament via statute to do so. This is not necessarily unconstitutional.")

Judicial officers must be afforded a reasonable level of discretion in the context of their proceedings, both in order to ensure fairness during judicial proceedings and to continue a workable pace of the proceedings. Where judicial officers are not explicitly commanded by statute or procedure to act in a certain way, they may use this reasonable level of discretion to conduct their proceedings in order to maintain these twin goals of fairness and speed.

Here, the authorizing statute for the rules of evidence cited by Claimant do not mandate that a judicial officer must accept any and all witnesses. So too do this court's own procedures not demand that all witnesses be accepted without any discretion from the court. Indeed, no limit on the court's discretion has been described. In acting entirely within one's own space—here, the procedures of a legal action—reasonable discretion is permissible when dealing with the assigned functions of that entity.

Any person who has worked within the government during the lifespan of our national project surely understands that having to abide strictly to specific rules that contain within them the only allowable actions does not enable efficient and practicable operation. This method of governance may be desirable in some portions of a society, but not in the judiciary. We retain the ability to make reasonable decisions as to procedure when those decisions are based in fairness, efficiency, and are not outside the bounds set by law.

To that end, the denials petitioned against above were made in the interest of efficiency.

---

The first of the denied witnesses, Ibney, was called as "a legal expert, lawmaker, and helped with the 2025 Election Results and can speak on the letter of the law." Witnesses must have a purpose, and the purpose stated for this witness is to "speak on the letter of the law." We can only assume this means that he would give his opinion as to what the law means. Claimant also states in his petition that Ibney would be an expert witness with "specific technical knowledge as to the impacts of the restrictions on the plaintiff and the country at large."

Witnesses are called to give testimony on facts of the case, and expert witnesses are called to inform the trier of fact on technical or difficult to understand matters related to the case that the trier of fact would not reasonably know. Here, the Claimant does not explain in great detail as to what exactly Ibney would testify on. While parties are not required to give exhaustive statements as to their proposed witnesses qualifications and topics of discussion—we do not seek to rigorously vet any and all witnesses proposed—in some matters we require more than a concise statement of purpose.

Witnesses may not give conclusions of law, and attorney expert witnesses may not attempt to share conclusions of interpretation or constitutionality. These three final determinations are solely the domain of the court, and may not be usurped. To have any witness attempt to give conclusions of law, attempt to share conclusions of interpretation, or discuss the constitutionality or legality of any matter is wholly inappropriate. This is, again, solely the jurisdiction of the court and no witness should ever attempt to tread beyond that line separating the judge from the parties.

Here, Ibney has been called to his stance as an attorney, former legislator, and being able to "speak on the letter of the law." It is also claimed he has some technical knowledge that is of some use. His qualifications are only relevant as to the purpose of speaking on the law, and we can only assume this action would be to tell us his interpretation on the law and how it should be administered. This is inappropriate, unhelpful, and would do nothing but waste our time, the parties' time, and the witness's time.

Further, in this case we do not foresee any technical facts or complicated workings that we could not resolve ourselves—and indeed the Claimant has not suggested any. Technical facts are not those that are specific about a law, custom, or situation, but those that are so nuanced, niche, and convoluted that an individual of reasonable intelligence would not readily know or understand. The knowledge, skill, or experience of the witness must be of a quality that their knowledge will help the trial of fact to understand the evidence presented or determine a fact that the trier otherwise could not.

The matter before us is interpretation of a law. As discussed above, interpretation is wholly within the realm of the court. The only time an expert witness should testify on interpretation is when a specific action, custom, or word has some deeper meaning behind it that a reasonable trier of fact would not be expected to understand. We did not find, and were not convinced, that this exists.

For all of those reasons above, Ibney is not a proper witness to this case. If there indeed exists some technical fact that this court could not reasonably be expected to understand, Claimant is encouraged to respond with a good-faith explanation as to what this fact is and why a reasonable trier of fact could not be expected to interpret properly without the witness's testimony on that matter.

---

Second, CasualGreyKnight is not an appropriate witness in this matter. Casual was described as "[someone who] was present [at the writing of the Constitution] and helped with the writing of the Alexandrian Constitution."

The stated purpose of this witness is to assist in giving a first-hand account of legislative history. While surely of great interest to historians and political minds, this testimony is of no value or interest in a jurisprudential context. As noted above, only the court may rule on matters of interpretation. Parties may propose or advance theories, or present evidence as to facts of the history of interpretation, but may not introduce testimony as to that interpretation.

For these reasons, CasualGreyKnight is an improper witness.

---

For all of the reasons above, the court did not abuse its discretion. The denial of the two listed witnesses were proper. The bar for a witness to be called is low, but witnesses must be relevant and must not be improper or wade into the territory of the court. Therefore we deny the writ of reconsideration.

---

Claimant is advised that a request for a writ of prompting is the improper venue for this request. Claimant instead should an entreaty of continuance.

We grant a modified writ of continuance, valued at forty-eight hours from the time of this post.

IN THE HIGH CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
ENTREATY FOR PROMPTING

Your honour, this may not be the proper entreaty, but it is the one that makes the most sense. If there is a better one, please let me know.

Per the Chancery Rules updated 9/10, the Plaintiff would like to know how the Chancery voted on the Entreaty of Reconsideration.

If it were only the Presiding Officer who made this ruling, I ask that the reasoning behind that be known. The court rules were updated on Wednesday at 11:22AM (MST), and my entreaty was filed after that update on Wednesday at 12:30PM (MST).

If a party wishes to dispute a presiding officer's decision, they may move for reconsideration, which the Chancery as a whole shall rule on. Abuse of this motion will result in a contempt of court charge.

 

[Smallfries]

Per the Chancery Rules updated 9/10, the Plaintiff would like to know how the Chancery voted on the Entreaty of Reconsideration.

The Chancery voted 2-0 to all sections.

If it were only the Presiding Officer who made this ruling

There is no Presiding officer in this case.

The court rules were updated on Wednesday at 11:22AM (MST), and my entreaty was filed after that update on Wednesday at 12:30PM (MST).

As you correctly implicate, that rule change does not apply to these proceedings.

 

[ameslap]

IN THE HONOURABLE CHANCERY
Opening Statement

May it please the Court.

By placing restrictions on a citizen’s right to run for and hold public office, the Kingdom of Alexandria has violated its own Constitution. In doing so, it has not only harmed the rule of law but it has harmed me directly.

On the First Defense:
Let us begin by looking closely at the Constitution itself.

The following rights and freedoms are guaranteed as stated, subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law that are justified in a free and democratic society.

1. Every citizen has the right to participate in and run for office
2. Every citizen has the right to vote in elections and referendums provided the player meets the citizenship requirements set by law.

The key phrase here is "every citizen." According to the dictionary, “every” means each individual without exception. The Constitution does not say “some citizens” or “citizens who meet further criteria.” It says every citizen, a term that leaves no room for arbitrary restriction.

Now consider how the Constitution distinguishes between rights that may be limited and those that may not. The very next line says:

Every citizen has the right to vote in elections and referendums provided the player meets the citizenship requirements set by law.

This qualification shows that the framers of the Constitution knew how to limit rights when they intended to. The fact that no such clause appears alongside the right to run for office is legally significant. If Parliament had the power to restrict candidacy rights, the Constitution would have said so just as it did for voting. There are no “reasonable limits prescribed by law that are justified” when it comes to “every citizen”.

Thus, any restriction imposed on the right to run for office, such as activity thresholds or other arbitrary criteria, violates both the letter and spirit of Article 22.

---

On the Second Defense:
The Crown argues that its restrictions are justified because they ensure candidates possess "requisite knowledge" of the Kingdom’s affairs. But this is fundamentally flawed.

To become a citizen, one must already meet certain conditions such as a waiting period and a knowledge test. These requirements serve as a vetting process. Once those standards are met and citizenship is granted, every citizen must be presumed qualified to exercise all rights of citizenship, including the right to run for office.

To allow the Crown to then impose further qualifications is to create two-tiered citizenship, where some citizens are more equal than others. This is not the foundation of a free and democratic society.

Moreover, the claim that restrictions prevent “uninformed and unqualified” candidates from jeopardizing Parliament is a slippery slope. Who defines “qualified”? What’s to stop future Parliaments from requiring ideological purity, insider knowledge, or allegiance to a party? One day it’s playtime requirements, the next it could be a “secret code,” as a fictional example, or loyalty tests. This Court must not open that door.

---

In Summary:

• The Constitution guarantees that every citizen has the right to run for office.
• It makes clear distinctions when limitations are allowed and this is not one of them.
• Citizenship already entails proving competence under current law.
• Additional restrictions violate both constitutional protections and democratic principles.

I respectfully ask the Honourable Chancery to uphold the Constitution and protect the rights of all citizens without exception.

 

[Smallfries]

The Crown shall have seventy-two hours to submit their opening statement.

 

[Capt11543]

IN THE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
ENTREATY TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE
ENTREATY FOR CONTINUANCE

Honorable Chancellors,

In their opening statement, Plaintiff refers to the citizenship test administered by the Ministry of Welfare. The citizenship test has not been admitted into evidence up to this point in these proceedings. The Crown believes that to adequately respond to Plaintiff’s arguments surrounding the citizenship test, the questions on the exam (but not the answers) ought to be admitted into evidence so that the Crown may properly refer to them. Accordingly, the Crown petitions the Court for permission to submit the citizenship exam questions into evedince.

Additionally, the Crown petitions the Court for 48-hour continuance for the Opening Statement deadline, as Your Honors’ ruling on the above Entreaty to Submit Evidence will materially affect the Crown's opening statement.

Respectfully submitted,
Capt11543
Acting Crown Counsel

 

[ameslap]

IN THE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
ENTREATY TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE
ENTREATY FOR CONTINUANCE

Honorable Chancellors,

In their opening statement, Plaintiff refers to the citizenship test administered by the Ministry of Welfare. The citizenship test has not been admitted into evidence up to this point in these proceedings. The Crown believes that to adequately respond to Plaintiff’s arguments surrounding the citizenship test, the questions on the exam (but not the answers) ought to be admitted into evidence so that the Crown may properly refer to them. Accordingly, the Crown petitions the Court for permission to submit the citizenship exam questions into evedince.

Additionally, the Crown petitions the Court for 48-hour continuance for the Opening Statement deadline, as Your Honors’ ruling on the above Entreaty to Submit Evidence will materially affect the Crown's opening statement.

Respectfully submitted,
Capt11543
Acting Crown Counsel

Response
Your honor, if I may be allowed a response to this. If not, please strike.

While the Plaintiff does not outright disagree with the inclusion, I do object to its relevance. The central question at stake is whether my removal as a candidate was unconstitutional, and the questions asked have no actual bearing on that answer. The Plaintiff makes the argument that passing the waiting period and citizenship test makes you qualified for office, it doesn’t matter what is on that test.

Respectfully submitted,
Ameslap

 

[SoggehToast]

IN THE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
REQUEST TO RESCIND ENTREATY TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE
REQUEST TO RESCIND ENTREATY FOR CONTINUANCE

Honorable Chancellors,

The Crown respectfully withdraws its filing submitted on September 14. Upon further review, the Crown finds that neither the entreaty to submit evidence nor the entreaty for continuance is necessary to its defense. In the interest of respecting the Court’s time, and in recognition of the unusual and potentially disruptive nature of filing such requests after the period of discovery, the Crown hereby formally withdraws these entreaties.

Respectfully submitted,

Soggeh T. Oast
Minister of Justice
Kingdom of Alexandria

 

[SoggehToast]

IN THE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
OPENING STATEMENT

INTRODUCTION
The Crown affirms the plaintiff's assertion that the constitutional right to run for office applies equally and uniformly to all citizens of the Kingdom. However, the claim that there are 'no reasonable limits prescribed by law that are justified' when it comes to 'every citizen' is based on a misunderstanding of how constitutional rights operate.

ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTION
Plaintiff relies on the use of universal language, such as “Every citizen” or “Every player,” to make this claim, as well as the assumption that such language supersedes all other language in Article 22. However, the Crown argues that the structure of that Article does not support this claim. The first sentence of K. A. Const. §5 Art. 22 reads: “The following rights and freedoms are guaranteed as stated, subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law that are justified in a free and democratic society,” and it is followed by the list of Constitutional rights. This structure is deliberate and instructs us that each right enumerated by the Article is subject to reasonable limits as defined therein.

The Constitution's use of universal language in Article 22 simply ensures equal protection under the law. It does not contradict the above clause and exempt players from reasonable regulations based on objective, verifiable criteria applied uniformly to all citizens. Given the consistent use of universal language in this Article, Plaintiff’s interpretation would logically demand that Parliament lacks authority to impose any restriction whatsoever on any constitutional right enumerated in Article 22, regardless of how reasonable or justified it may be. Guaranteeing absolute exercise of every constitutional right is a practical impossibility and would necessarily eviscerate the Government's capacity to administer and enforce the law.

The assertion that "[the] qualification [on the right to vote] shows that the framers of the Constitution knew how to limit rights when they intended" is also moot given the structure of Article 22. The mere existence of an explicit limit on a right set forth in the Constitution does not necessarily preclude the Crown from establishing further reasonable limits when justified. Otherwise, the reasonable limits clause would not have been included at all.

ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATION
The Crown respectfully maintains that reasonable playtime requirements present in A.P. 018 constitute a constitutional exercise of Parliament's authority to define elections, K.A. Const. § I Art. 5.5. This requirement is justified under the Constitution's "reasonable limits" provision: it serves a legitimate purpose, ensuring all candidates are informed, qualified, and active; is based on objective, verifiable criteria; and was applied uniformly to all citizens.

Furthermore, the complainant has argued that “certain conditions” such as the “waiting period and a knowledge test” are sufficient metrics for a player’s legislative competency. This is not so. The citizenship exam does not measure a potential legislator's knowledge of ongoing political affairs, activity, or meaningful engagement with the server. The citizenship exam is merely a one-time, 10-question, constitutional literacy exam that includes some questions about the server rules and early history. Neither the citizenship exam nor the waiting period, which demands no active engagement with the server at all, adequately serves the same legitimate purpose as the playtime requirement.

ON THE “SLIPPERY SLOPE”
During their opening statement, the plaintiff asked the following:

Moreover, the claim that restrictions prevent “uninformed and unqualified” candidates from jeopardizing Parliament is a slippery slope. Who defines “qualified”? What’s to stop future Parliaments from requiring ideological purity, insider knowledge, or allegiance to a party? One day it’s playtime requirements, the next it could be a “secret code,” as a fictional example, or loyalty tests. This Court must not open that door.

The Constitution vests the chancery with jurisdiction over constitutional matters. The Crown has provided a legitimate reason to impose limitations on the right to run for office. As such, the Chancery has the authority to rule on the reasonableness of that stated purpose and on the requirement as a whole. Simply allowing the Crown to impose reasonable and justified limitations, as is expressly permitted by the constitution, does not therefore mean the Chancery is forced to allow unreasonable and unjustified ones. Parliament may have the power to write laws, K.A. Const. § I Art. 3.1; but the Chancery has the power to rule on their constitutionality, id. at Art. 15.

IN SUMMARY:

• All rights enumerated in Article 22 are subject to reasonable restrictions.
• The inability to impose reasonable restrictions would demand absolute rights, which are undesirable and practically impossible.
• The playtime requirement is a reasonable, objective, and uniformly applied law that uniquely serves its legitimate purpose.
• Allowing Parliament to impose reasonable limits does not constitute a “slippery slope.”

Respectfully submitted,

Soggeh T. Oast
Minister of Justice
Kingdom of Alexandria

 

[Smallfries]

At this time, the Claimant shall have twenty-four hours to pose their questions to the witness, @Thritystone. The witness is reminded he is under oath at all times during this case.

 

[ameslap]

Minister @Thritystone, thank you so much for being with us here today. Here are some of the questions I shall pose now, and I may have follow-up questions.

1. What evidence, if any, shows that higher playtime leads to better or more effective legislators?

2. Is it true that a citizen can accumulate playtime without ever participating in debates, proposing legislation, or engaging with the community in any way?

3. Conversely, is it also true that a citizen who spends less time online but actively studies the laws, follows parliamentary actions, and contributes to discussions may be more qualified than one who idles for hours?

4. Parliament already designs and controls the citizenship exam, correct?

5. Given that Parliament decides the content of the exam, why could it not adjust the exam if it wished to ensure deeper knowledge or engagement?

6. What specific competency does the playtime requirement measure that the waiting period and citizenship exam do not?

 

[Thritystone]

IN RESPONSE TO AMESLAP:
1. MOIA did not conduct a comprehensive study of this question
2. It is not possible
3. It is not possible
4. No. It is not solely the design and control of Parliament.
5. I do not understand this question.
6. Practical experience and understanding of the material conditions that the candidate intends to govern.

 

[ameslap]

IN RESPONSE TO AMESLAP:
1. MOIA did not conduct a comprehensive study of this question
2. It is not possible
3. It is not possible
4. No. It is not solely the design and control of Parliament.
5. I do not understand this question.
6. Practical experience and understanding of the material conditions that the candidate intends to govern.

Follow up questions:
1. You stated that the Ministry did not conduct a comprehensive study on whether playtime leads to better legislators. Why did the Ministry choose 4 hours in the past 30 days as the requirement?

2. Are you aware of how Parliament came to the 4 hour figure?

3. You wrote that it is “not possible” for a citizen to accumulate playtime without engaging in debates, legislation, or the community. How does the Ministry monitor playtime to ensure it only reflects meaningful participation and not idle presence?

4. You also wrote that it is “not possible” for a citizen with less playtime to be more qualified. Can you explain how playtime equates to qualifications for office?

5. You stated Parliament does not “solely” design and control the citizenship exam. Could you identify exactly who does design it, and what role Parliament plays in approving or revising its content?

6. If Parliament wished to add more questions testing engagement or knowledge of current affairs, is there anything preventing it from doing so?

7. What specific gap does the exam fail to cover that only raw playtime can address?

8. Assume a player spent 4 hours in the build world without ever engaging with another player. Would they qualify to run for office under the current laws?

There may yet be more follow up.

 

[SoggehToast]

IN THE CHANCERY OF ALEXANDRIA
OBJECTIONS TO QUESTIONS

Honorable Chancellors, the Crown raises the following objections to Plaintiff's questions directed to Minister Thritystone.

1. What evidence, if any, shows that higher playtime leads to better or more effective legislators?

OBJECTION - LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
Minister Thritystone would not, merely as a consequence of their previous role as Minister of Internal Affairs, have any knowledge regarding empirical evidence on legislator competency.

3. Conversely, is it also true that a citizen who spends less time online but actively studies the laws, follows parliamentary actions, and contributes to discussions may be more qualified than one who idles for hours?

OBJECTION - CALLS FOR SPECULATION AND LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
This question calls for the witness to speculate on the relative qualifications of hypothetical candidates. The witness cannot credibly testify on these fictitious scenarios, which are not naturally based on the witness’s perceptions as Minister of Internal Affairs. As such, this question also falls outside the scope of the witness's personal knowledge.

4. Parliament already designs and controls the citizenship exam, correct?

OBJECTION - LEADING THE WITNESS
The question is phrased in a manner which asserts an affirmative answer and invites the witness to agree.

5. Given that Parliament decides the content of the exam, why could it not adjust the exam if it wished to ensure deeper knowledge or engagement?

OBJECTION - ASSUMES FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE AND LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
This question presupposes that Parliament has the authority or capacity to directly control the contents of the citizenship exam, which is a matter outside of the witness's personal knowledge. In fact, there is no reason to assume the witness, the previous Minister of Internal Affairs, would have any personal knowledge regarding the citizenship exam at all, which falls under the Ministry of Welfare. Additionally, this question assumes a particular answer to the question preceding it.

6. What specific competency does the playtime requirement measure that the waiting period and citizenship exam do not?

OBJECTION - LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
As stated in the previous objection, the citizenship exam falls under the Ministry of Welfare, not the Ministry of Internal Affairs. While the witness could have some credible knowledge on the administration of the playtime requirement during elections, it is unclear how their speculation on the role of the citizenship exam would be of value to the Court.

Respectfully submitted,

Soggeh T. Oast
Minister of Justice
Kingdom of Alexandria

 

[ameslap]

IN THE CHANCERY OF ALEXANDRIA
OBJECTIONS TO QUESTIONS

Honorable Chancellors, the Crown raises the following objections to Plaintiff's questions directed to Minister Thritystone.


OBJECTION - LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
Minister Thritystone would not, merely as a consequence of their previous role as Minister of Internal Affairs, have any knowledge regarding empirical evidence on legislator competency.


OBJECTION - CALLS FOR SPECULATION AND LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
This question calls for the witness to speculate on the relative qualifications of hypothetical candidates. The witness cannot credibly testify on these fictitious scenarios, which are not naturally based on the witness’s perceptions as Minister of Internal Affairs. As such, this question also falls outside the scope of the witness's personal knowledge.


OBJECTION - LEADING THE WITNESS
The question is phrased in a manner which asserts an affirmative answer and invites the witness to agree.


OBJECTION - ASSUMES FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE AND LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
This question presupposes that Parliament has the authority or capacity to directly control the contents of the citizenship exam, which is a matter outside of the witness's personal knowledge. In fact, there is no reason to assume the witness, the previous Minister of Internal Affairs, would have any personal knowledge regarding the citizenship exam at all, which falls under the Ministry of Welfare. Additionally, this question assumes a particular answer to the question preceding it.


OBJECTION - LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
As stated in the previous objection, the citizenship exam falls under the Ministry of Welfare, not the Ministry of Internal Affairs. While the witness could have some credible knowledge on the administration of the playtime requirement during elections, it is unclear how their speculation on the role of the citizenship exam would be of value to the Court.

Respectfully submitted,

Soggeh T. Oast
Minister of Justice
Kingdom of Alexandria

Your honour, I plan on responding to these objections, I am just not in a place that I can at the moment.

I would ask that the court continue to allow the witness to respond to questions while these objections are being ruled on.