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The Chancery denies this entreaty.IN THE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
ENTREATY FOR RECONSIDERATION
The Chancery allowed this case to sit for 5 months, and then again for 2 months, for a total of 7 months ignoring the case and not responding to my filings.
It is incredibly unjust to do this and then strike a filing for being 17 minutes late.
Opinion of the Chancery delivered by Chancellor Chips.
What is the measure of one’s own truth that may be delivered before that truth becomes uncouth? This is the heart of today’s controversy.
Claimant Dartanboy, then a member of Parliament assembled, communicated in the course of Parliamentary affairs his belief that a previous statement of the then-Prime Minister’s was facetious. This accusation of lying was taken unkindly by others, who requested the then-Speaker of Parliament to force Claimant to withdraw his allegedly inflammatory speech in order to make a “[more] parliamnetar[ily] refined one.”
This request was granted, and Claimant questioned the order as an abbreviation of his right to political communication. The Speaker then warned, and on a final rebuke by Claimant, the Speaker suspended Claimant. This action followed.
Claimant’s claim for relief rests upon the supposition that the Speaker of Parliament “protects the rights of Members of Parliament to speak freely within the Parliament,” and the action by the Speaker both breaks this solemn vow and runs afoul of one of Claimant’s individual rights. We review in full.
1. Facts
During a discussion debate over a proposed bill, the then-Prime Minister made a statement regarding issues he had regarding the law. In response, Claimant stated that the Prime Minister was “lying, and everyone [knew] it.” Further, Claimant supposed that the Prime Minister’s statement was a “well-written paragraph [that called] for unity,” while all the while hiding “his [mal]-intent” as to some of the Prime Minister’s previous actions.
In response, another member of Parliament spoke up, deriding Claimant’s speech as inflammatory and demanding a more refined statement be made in response. This demand was accompanied by an appeal to the Speaker to enforce this motion.
The Speaker chastised Claimant for the “disrespectful and unprofessional manner” in which he spoke and ordered the statement to strike his message. Claimant defied, saying he would not strike his statement as he had a constitutional right to it. Another warning followed; following that, Claimant’s final response: “No[.]” The final communication in this saga was the Speaker’s official punishment, an eight-hour suspension from typing in the forum.
2. Law
Legislative power is granted in the Parliament of Alexandria, and its presiding officer—the Speaker—is chosen to preside and maintain order. K.A. Const. Part I, §§ 1, 4(1)–(2) (FriesLaw, 5/22/26). The Speaker is charged with ensuring that debates are “conducted in an orderly manner and may call members to order if necessary.” Id. at § 4(2). Further, the Speaker is tasked with safeguarding the parliamentary privilege to “speak freely within the Parliament.” Id. at § 4(6). All players have freedom of political communication. Id. at Part V, § 22(6). However, this may be cabined with those reasonable limits justified in a free and democratic society. See Freakyyyybob158 v. Crown of Alexandria, Case 5 (Ch. 2026); Ameslap v. Crown of Alexandria, Case 12 (Ch. 2025).
3. Discussion
I. Order and Liberty
We begin, as always, with the text of the Constitution. The Speaker of Parliament is charged with “ensur[ing] that debates are conducted in an orderly manner, and may call members to order if necessary.” Further, they are to “[protect] the rights of Members of Parliament to speak freely within the Parliament.”
Taking these sentences literally, it is clear that the discussions held in Parliament have two competing interests: order and free expression. On one end, it can be imagined that a state favoring ultimate liberty and freedom of expression can lose all order and structure, and become wholly incapable of governance. See generally Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil (1651). On the other, a discussion restricted only to the most courteous and orderly standards would indeed promote order, but very little else; Parliament may find it difficult to get any business done or properly see to any contentious matters of state (let alone hashing out any disagreements that may exist in the public) without a bit of disorder. See generally John Locke, Essay Concerning The True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government (1689).
We seek a rational island of workability between these two extremes. We find it clear that for the proper administration of government that also protects the rights and interests of the people, it is necessary for some amount of disorder within Parliamentary business to be allowed, and for some amount of enforced order to be tolerable. Without the former, it would be difficult indeed for genuine issues to be discussed and dealt with, and without the latter we would find it difficult to do any business at all. Therefore, it is clear to us that the primary charge of the Speaker in this context is not to mind manners and demand total obedience in all cases, but to serve as the steward of orderly conduct and ensure debates may proceed without derailing into uncouth yelling matches or verbal brawls.
However, another wrinkle presents itself: the Constitution grants a right to political communication to all citizens. Could it be permissible that a citizen on the street could yell and accuse a politician of lying, and then be punished for that fact? If so, then why? If not, why is the instant case treated differently? Does the Speaker’s power necessarily cabin the right to political communication? If so, then why is there an explicit demand that the Speaker protect that right?
We find it important to order ourselves around the proper question to ask, and allow all things to flow from there. Claimant’s communication is, to some extent, a political communication. However, it is clear this right is not absolute. See Case 12 (2025); Case 5 (2026). Further, other portions of Claimant’s communication may not be political in nature, and therefore would not be protected. Finally, it is perhaps permissible to imagine that a statement, protected by the right to political communication, may be chastened to moderation yet fall short of wholesale censorship.
II. On the Matter of Language
The correct question to ask is not whether the Speaker acted because the statement was a political communication, but rather did the Speaker act because of its political communication content. To elaborate on this point and dissect the matter at hand, we break Claimant’s communication into four quarters: (1) The accusation of lying; (2) the insinuation that “everyone [knew]” the Prime Minister was lying, implying brazenness; (3) accusing the Prime Minister of being deceptive in their statements; and (4) a rhetorical question to back their allegation.
To accuse another, a colleague, of lying or being deceptive in the forum of your work is disruptive. This is obvious. Therefore, it is theoretically within the realm of the Speaker to act against such statements, as any disorderly conduct raises the possibility of intervention. However, the forum in question is a political one—as is the statement. To accuse a politician of lying to other politicians on a political issue in a political forum is clearly a political statement. The issue, then, is which do we value more: order or liberty?
The answer lies in the Constitution itself. The Constitution does not demand that all speech in Parliament must be nice, neither does it forbid any negative or even accusatory statements. The Constitution implies only that discussions must remain orderly. Focused solely on the accusation of lying, there is no other unnecessary or extraneous language. The first quarter of Claimant’s speech is certainly political communication, and we find it should remain protected speech. There is no way to censor or re-order this speech without infringing on a core political statement of Claimant, and there is no reason to demand its removal besides issue with the political speech itself. This clearly is a part of that kind of speech which the Speaker is charged with protecting within Parliament. We find the disorderly result or character of the statement is irrelevant as a result, and it cannot be moderated.
The second part of the speech follows immediately after, and involves Claimant alleging that the Prime Minister was so brazen in his lies that everyone knew he was lying. Taken further, this seems to allude to a claim that anybody that may disagree with Claimant in this statement is either wrong, unintelligent, or lying to themselves or others. No part of this seems to be protected political speech, and seems highly inflammatory. We see no reason to give this constitutional protection or find it was improperly moderated.
The third part likewise is somewhat disruptive. However, in this part, Claimant states only facts (whether true or not is not within the scope of this inquiry, only that it is a factual statement and there is no allegation of intentional falsehood or fraudulence). These facts are all stated in a rhetorical matter to back up his accusation of lying. Though certainly meant to rile up those on either side of the issue, it seems to weigh in favor of being protected political speech. If nothing else, there is no real way to re-order or cut out any parts of this speech without infringing on some political statement. As there is no extraneous element here, we find it is indeed political speech.
Finally, part four is clearly not political speech. Though related to politics (“Independents will not stand by and watch. We will call you out.”), there is no real political statement here. This part is little more than a threat, and though this could be reasonably construed as political speech for one purpose or another, it is highly inflammatory and combined with the other portions of Claimant’s statements and can easily be re-ordered or removed without compromising the core political statements of Claimant. Therefore, it seems likely that there is a justified and reasonable rationale for the Speaker to curtail this speech to promote orderly conduct in Parliament.
III. Weighing the Scales
The Government contends that the Speaker’s actions here are distinguished from any actual infringement of political communication because ultimately speech is allowed; Claimant was just too abrasive and inflammatory in their conduct. Specifically, the Crown offers the example of the Speaker forbidding discussion on a certain topic, motion, or bill as an example of the kind of political speech that would be a violation of the Speaker’s duties. While the example is correct, it is not particularly helpful in this case, and only serves to establish one end of the range of behaviors that would be unlawful.
In no way does the government example set up an upper limit or otherwise display how the instant case does not contain political communication. Instead, they suppose that Claimant was only suspended because of how they acted after his initial comment, not for any reasoning relevant to the comment itself. This is clearly false. The evidence on the record clearly shows that Claimant was first informally censured by the Speaker as a result of his original comment, discussed supra.
Ultimately, we find both sides have some purchase here. However, while the second and fourth quarters of the speech were unprotected and inflammatory, the Speaker used government power to demand all of it be struck. The Speaker was not specific about what was or was not ok, and without any limitations the only logical conclusion is that the Speaker must have meant all of it, even with the bare fact that the Speaker seems to have been okay with the accusation of lying; having an issue solely in the way the accusation was worded. Despite recognizing this, the Speaker does not hold carte blanche to demand the entire message be struck and to refrain from such conduct in the future. There is no segmentation here, political speech is included.
The Speaker struck Claimant’s speech because his conduct, including the accusation itself, was “disorderly.” If we did not allow any disorderly speech, some political speech would have to be banned outright, including most (if not all) speech that caused controversy, political uproar, or conflict in Parliament. Political speech is a right citizens hold, and it is a right the Speaker is tasked with protecting within the halls and channels of Parliament.
Therefore, though some of the speech was unprotected and inflammatory and thus within the Speaker’s right and duty to moderate, other parts were not and should have been left unmolested. When the Speaker demanded all of Claimant’s speech to be struck, and when Claimant refused to do so and was punished for all of that speech, the Speaker violated both Claimant’s right to political communication, and the Speaker’s own constitutional duty to protect political speech within Parliament. The Speaker could have demanded some parts be amended to be less inflammatory, but not all of it, and certainly could not strike all of it.
IV. Determining Relief
In the case of triumph, Claimant requests (in an amended filing, which was lost in proceedings and we accept post-hoc without contest) four points of relief: (1) A public apology from the Speaker; (2) £250 pounds in legal fees; (3) a public statement from Parliament affirming, in essence, our holding today; and (4) a public apology from the former Speaker that punished Claimant for the rights violation.
We refuse to grant relief as to points one, three, and four, and decline to ever honor any like relief. In essence, Claimant demands a positive covenant for a personal service in each of these points—or put simply, demands that people do something. We believe this is highly disfavored in a modern democratic society, and decline to allow it. We explain why below.
The Constitution grants each person the right to life, liberty, and security of their person, and a right to not be deprived thereof. K.A. Const. Part V, § 22(11). The right to liberty and security of their person hold our interest here. If a person is forced to act in a way which is unrelated to any public power or duty, how is this not a breach of liberty? If a person is threatened with state violence or police power to do so, how is this not a breach of the security of their person? It is clear to us that these rights, so fundamental to a free and democratic society, are meant above all to banish one particularly foul evil: slavery.
To be forced to act against your will or have your person threatened or seized by state power should you refuse to do so is slavery at worst and unjustifiable tyranny at best. For us to order members of society (be they government officials or citizens on the street) to stand on a box and perform a humiliation ritual after some wrongdoing is cruel, demeaning, and a punishment both unjust and uncivilized. Though it may be within the primal instincts of some to demand such a performance of penance when wrongdoing has been done, the rule of law we are blessed with in Alexandria forbids it. A criminal may be sentenced to jail, it is true. A government official may be forced to do their job (unless they resign, though the office they inhabited may still be indebted via mandamus to perform their government task). These do not rise to the impermissible form of private and personal compelled servitude that our law forbids.
One may not enforce another to perform any personal action memorialized in a broken contract. One neighbor may not demand another design their land on an aesthetic desire the first finds more appealing. And, here, one party may not demand any personal action from another party, no matter how upstanding or intuitively just that action may be or unjust the grievance at hand was. This would be a wholly undemocratic and barbaric practice, utterly divorced from any semblance of civilization, egality, and rule of law. Rejoice that we recognize this fact today, and despair for those who live under regimes that hold otherwise.
As a result, we order that Claimant be paid £250 from the Crown for legal fees. We thank all for their time.
