Appeal: Accepted Entreaty for Prior Ponderance I (Ch. 2025)

[Capt11543]

IN THE CHANCERY OF ALEXANDRIA
ENTREATY FOR PRIOR PONDERANCE

Honorable Chancellors, I humbly request prior ponderance and a ruling regarding the following unsettled matters of law:

I. RELIEF FOR ACTIONS IN THE OUTBACK
Are Plaintiffs entitled to seek relief for damages if those damages result from actions perpetrated in the Outback?

II. FORMS AND LIMITATIONS OF DAMAGES
What forms of damages are available for Plaintiffs to pursue (i.e. emotional, compensatory, punitive), and are there any limitations as to the amount of damages which may be pursued?

III. STANDARD OF PROOF FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM CRIMINAL ACTS
What standard of proof is required to prove that a criminal act occurred in order to seek damages as relief for said criminal act in civil court?

Respectfully submitted to the Chancery on April 21, 2025,
Capt11543

 

[juniperfig]

​

CHANCERY OF ALEXANDRIA​

In a 3-0 vote, the Chancery of Alexandria has decided to ACCEPT the Entreaty of Prior Ponderance I.

In a 2-1 vote, the Chancery of Alexandria has decided to ACCEPT the Entreaty of Prior Ponderance II.

In a 2-1 vote, the Chancery of Alexandria has decided to ACCEPT the Entreaty of Prior Ponderance III.

The Chancery shall now undertake solemn deliberation upon these valid and important questions, and shall deliver its judgement promptly.

Thus is the will of the Chancery.​

 

[Smallfries]

IN THE CHANCERY OF
THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
VERDICT
​

The Chancery has deliberated en banc and has come to the following conclusions regarding the Writ of Prior Ponderance previously promulgated:

QUESTION ONE
​

The Majority, delivered by Chancellor Smallfries and joined by Chief Justice Juniperfig, is as follows:

The question before us here is if aggrieved individuals may seek relief for damages originating from the Outback. The Chancery finds that they may. However, there are limitations.

The Outback, by its definition, is a wild and lawless land ungraced by proper civilization. The borders of Alexandria do not extend to it, as the concurrence agrees, and it would be foolish to say our reach would ever apply ubiquitously where our borders do not extend. The Chancery cannot unilaterally claim territory where no previous Government action supports this claim. The existence of a "Wilderness" section under Parliament's sub-forum for laws perhaps implies a future interest in laws related to the Outback, but does not implicitly authorize an immediate Judicial expedition into the Great Wastes and colonizing those vast biomes in the name of Alexandria. This is an action for the Parliament assembled, and for Parliament alone. The Moon and the Stars are similarly lawless places outside of Alexandria's borders, and it would make no sense for the Chancery to claim our laws applied there.

However, this does not mean that actions originating within the Outback are forever and always free from consequences within civilized society. A nuclear weapon launched from the Outback finding their target in the heart of Alexandria surely is an illegal act, and it is laughable for such an evildoer to raise the defense that their attack came from the Outback, and thus they are immune from litigation. Similarly, any individual wishing to engage in fraud, or misrepresentation, or slander, or any other conduct that is or could be forbidden within Alexandria could not simply flee to the Outback before committing their heinous deeds, as this would render any legislation on the matter void.

The question, then, is not one of "is the Outback within our Jurisdiction," but rather Judicial Officers must ask themselves "where does the harm focus?" The Chancery is satisfied that an answer can be reasonably and reliably found upon an examination on this premise. Simply looking to the alleged harm and seeing where its focus may lie can answer as to if one can sue for relief. Any action which sees the principal portion of its harm located within the borders of Alexandria may be granted relief, regardless of where it may have originated from. Any actions which one wishes initially to undertake in Alexandria, but decide to move to the Outback so as to somehow "escape" the State's watchful eye, likely falls under this long arm of the law.

This test is that of a rational person and should be construed in the context of the offense. An individual raiding an Outback base or stealing materials from another in the Outback likely should not be tried in Alexandria for those acts. However, a contract being violated where the aggrieved party operates their end of the bargain in Alexandria can. This doctrine is unrefined and novel, and we look forwards to sharpening our senses as litigation comes forth.

-
​

Chancellor Kaiserin Concurs:

Ultimately, I agree with the majority opinion: any action in which the primary harm is within the borders of Alexandria is grounds for relief. If the primary harm is within the Outback rather than the city, no relief can be granted.

However, I cannot, in good conscience, concur with the reasoning used by the majority to arrive at this decision. The Honourable Chancellor Smallfries has stated that the Outback is in the same legal state with regards to Alexandrian law as "The Moon and the Stars". This notion, in my opinion, sets a dangerous precedent. The mere fact that the Outback is currently lawless does not mean that it is completely outside the bounds of the Kingdom's authority to legislate upon it. An entire section of law, entitled "Wilderness Law", is present within the Acts of Parliament page. The only clear message we can garner from this is that Parliament has the intent to legislate as to what extent the laws of Alexandria apply to the Outback within the near future. To legislate upon what can and cannot be done in the Outback is to have it within our nation's jurisdiction. Is the Court to claim that this would be an aggressive expansion of our Kingdom's authority, or an invasion of some kind? No, that would be ridiculous. Yet, the majority claims that the Outback is firmly without of Alexandrian jurisdiction. This is an unnecessary restriction on Parliament's authority.

Further, allow us to look to our sister nation of Redmont. In that country, all laws passed by Congress apply to the Wild, except for certain explicitly stated exceptions, such as those pertaining to violent crime. The Wild is firmly within Redmont's jurisdiction, though importantly, not within its borders. I believe that this should be assumed to be the status quo in regards to Alexandria's relationship with the Outback as well. Under this assumption, however, we find ourselves without the established body of Wilderness law that Redmont has. All we know is that the Outback is intentionally labeled as "lawless" in many instances. Thus, until Parliament indicates to us otherwise, we must assume the following: the Outback is within Parliament's (and the Court's) jurisdiction; the Outback is not necessarily within Alexandria's borders; Parliament has chosen not to apply any of its current laws to the Outback.

Therefore, we arrive at the same conclusion as the majority opinion: unless the primary harm of an act lies within the city, where we know that all laws apply, relief cannot be granted. In the opinion of this Chancellor, however, it would be fully within the rights of Parliament to declare one day that any or all laws of our Kingdom apply to the Outback as well. While that hypothetical decision might be a strange one, it would be far from "colonization".

QUESTION TWO
​

Chancellor Smallfries delivers the Unanimous Opinion of the Court:

The Petitioner asks the Chancery to describe the types of damages available and if there are any limitations as to the amounts for each.

The Chancery does not believe it can adequately and definitively list all possible outcomes of a case or give any universal truth as to limits or minimums of granted relief thereof. There are a multitude of extenuating circumstances and outlandish scenarios that could alter how this Court or any other could rule on a matter.

However, the purpose of damages are threefold, and should be observed in the course of a verdict. These are: (1) Punitive damages, which seek to punish the offender in the name of Justice, (2) Restorative, which seeks to make the aggrieved Party(s) whole, and (3) Preventative, which seek to wave a red flag to all of society and warn that the actions undertaken by the offender are illicit and unprofitable, including the offender.

Damages, generally, must be no less than to accomplish one of the three missions above, and no more than is reasonably needed to accomplish all three.

QUESTION THREE
​

The Majority Opinion, delivered by Chancellor Kaiserin and joined by Chief Justice Juniperfig, is as follows:

The standard of proof required to prove that a criminal act has occurred, under any circumstances, is beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, in the interest of answering what was likely the Petitioner's actual question, the standard of proof required to hold a person liable for any act, criminal or otherwise, in a civil proceeding is the balance of probabilities. That is, through examination of the evidence and of all likely scenarios, the Court must be able to reasonably find that the act most likely occurred, and it must be able to be attributed to the alleged offender in the same manner.

Being found liable for a criminal act against a balance of probabilities in civil proceedings does not automatically mean that a crime has been committed.

-​

Chancellor Smallfries Concurs:

The issue in this question is what standard of proof is needed to prove that a criminal act occurred in order to seek damages.

The Petitioner here, by a ponderance of the language, is asking for clarification on the standard of proof to show that a crime itself has been committed in the course of a civil proceeding. The answer to this question is that a crime must have been committed beyond a reasonable doubt.

If the Petitioner instead meant to ask to what level does proof need to rise to hold an alleged offender liable for a criminal act in a civil case, the answer should be that a person is more likely than not responsible through preponderance of the evidence.

-

The Chancery thanks Petitioner for bringing these questions to the Court, and hopes the answers are found by all to be satisfcatory.​