Lawsuit: Adjourned .FreakyyyyBob158 v. Crown of Alexandria, Case 5 (Ch. 2026)

[Tacoman1619]

IN THE HONOURABLE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
BETWEEN
.FreakyyyyBob158 (Plantiff)
V.
The Crown of the Kingdom of Alexandria
(Defendant)
I. Jurisdictional Statement
This Court has jurisdiction over this suit through the Constitution of Alexandria Part III §15 which describes this Court as having exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional questions.

II. Parties
1. The Plaintiff .FreakyyyyBob158 is an Alexandrian Citizen who is unable to vote in the upcoming election despite meeting the activity requirement due to an inability to receive a passport.
2. The Defendant is the Crown of the Kingdom of Alexandria (hereinafter, "The Crown"), the legal entity recognised for the purposes of suits alleging constitutional violations and ultra vires acts by the organs of state. See Reallmza v. The Crown, Case 1 (Ch. 2025).

III. Facts
1. On June 11th, 2026 .FreakyyyyBob158 joined the server and filed an application for a passport.
2. The A.P.00-018 | Alexandrian Electoral Act states that eligability to vote for an election requires "(c) Hold a valid passport issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." See A.P.00-018 | Alexandrian Electoral Act.
3. As of June 19th, 2026, the Plantiff has not received his passport and is ineligible to vote.
4. The Constitution of Alexandria Part V §2 states, " Parliament may by law establish reasonable activity requirements for achieving and maintaining eligibility to vote."


IV. Claim For Relief
COUNT I: VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO VOTE
1. The requirement of a passport is not a requirement based on activity and therefore violates the Plantiff right to vote.
2. Even if this requirement is considered constitutional and based on activity, the MoIA has been slow and ineffective at processing them, therefore making the requirement unreasonable.

V. Prayer for Relief
1. The Court declare the requirement unconstitutional.
2. Issue an order allowing all citizens to vote without a passport if they meet the playtime requirement.

Respectfully submitted to the Chancery,
Tacoman1619, on behalf of .FreakyyyyBob158.

 

[Tacoman1619]

Here is my client granting me consent to represent him.

 

[Smallfries]

The Crown is commanded to appear before the Chancery int he case of .FreakyyyyBob158 v. Crown of Alexandria, Case 5 (Ch. 2026).

Failure to appear within 72 hours may result in a default judgment based on the known facts of the case. All parties will make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures.

 

[Tacoman1619]

IN THE HONOURABLE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA

ENTREATY FOR EMERGENCY RELIEF
Your Honors,

This case is a matter of grave national importance: the integrity of our sacred democratic process is at stake. My client, alongside a staggering number of voters, is being actively disenfranchised in the current general election. The MoFA has been given more than a reasonable time to process these passports, yet multiple double chests of applications remain. The legitimacy of the election is on the line.

I hereby request that an injunction be ordered suspending the requirement of a passport to vote or requiring MoFA to process all passport applications within the next 48 hours.

Respectfully submitted to the Chancery,
Tacoman1619, on behalf of .FreakyyyyBob158.

 

[Smallfries]

IN THE HONOURABLE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA

ENTREATY FOR EMERGENCY RELIEF
Your Honors,

This case is a matter of grave national importance: the integrity of our sacred democratic process is at stake. My client, alongside a staggering number of voters, is being actively disenfranchised in the current general election. The MoFA has been given more than a reasonable time to process these passports, yet multiple double chests of applications remain. The legitimacy of the election is on the line.

I hereby request that an injunction be ordered suspending the requirement of a passport to vote or requiring MoFA to process all passport applications within the next 48 hours.

Respectfully submitted to the Chancery,
Tacoman1619, on behalf of .FreakyyyyBob158.

[order]
CHANCERY OF ALEXANDRIA
ENTREATY - EMERGENCY RELIEF

The Chancery denies this. Elections with passports have been conducted already. The framework exists, and many people are able to vote with their passports. Though, if true, many new citizens may not be able to vote, we believe the harm in suspending legislation outright from Parliament to outweigh a suspension of the passport voting requirement. That legislation has not been otherwise challenged, and though we see harm here, we would prefer to uphold that status quo and later overturn the statute rather than radically suspend it and be unable to recant if we find the law valid.
[/order]

 

[Tacoman1619]

The Crown is commanded to appear before the Chancery int he case of .FreakyyyyBob158 v. Crown of Alexandria, Case 5 (Ch. 2026).

Failure to appear within 72 hours may result in a default judgment based on the known facts of the case. All parties will make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures.

IN THE HONOURABLE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA

Entreaty for Default Judgment

Your Honor,

The deadline for the Crown to submit a response has passed by over 16 hours. They have neither countered the plaintiff's claims nor requested a continuance. I request that you rule based on the facts that have been presented to you. The facts of this case are clear. The Constitution provides that only activity can be a requirement for voting. Accordingly, it is evident that the passport requirement in the A.P.00-018 | Alexandrian Electoral Act is unconstitutional. I request that the statute, A.P.00-018 | Alexandrian Electoral Act §17(1)(c) requiring passports to vote, be declared unconstitutional based on the simple facts of this case.

Respectfully submitted to the Chancery,
Tacoman1619, on behalf of .FreakyyyyBob158.

 

[Smallfries]

IN THE HONOURABLE CHANCERY OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA

Entreaty for Default Judgment

Your Honor,

The deadline for the Crown to submit a response has passed by over 16 hours. They have neither countered the plaintiff's claims nor requested a continuance. I request that you rule based on the facts that have been presented to you. The facts of this case are clear. The Constitution provides that only activity can be a requirement for voting. Accordingly, it is evident that the passport requirement in the A.P.00-018 | Alexandrian Electoral Act is unconstitutional. I request that the statute, A.P.00-018 | Alexandrian Electoral Act §17(1)(c) requiring passports to vote, be declared unconstitutional based on the simple facts of this case.

Respectfully submitted to the Chancery,
Tacoman1619, on behalf of .FreakyyyyBob158.

Granted. Case in recess pending verdict.

 

[Smallfries]

Verdict

Chancellor Chips writes the unanimous opinion of the Court.

Claimant .FreakyyyyBob158 (“Claimant”) files suit against the Crown in the Chancery for relief on a matter of electorate qualification. The Crown failed to respond to summons, and Claimant submitted an Entreaty for Default Judgment to dispose of the case “on the simple facts of this case.” We granted a Writ of Default Judgment. See General Court R. & Proc. § II(6).

I. Issue

The issue here is whether an act of Parliament which requires a citizen to have a valid passport in order to vote is constitutional.

II. Rule

All citizens have several rights, including the right to vote in elections. K.A. Const. Part V, § (22)(2) (FriesLaw, 5/22/26). Parliament is empowered to establish “reasonable activity requirements for achieving and maintaining eligibility to vote.” Id. All Part V rights and freedoms are subject to be limited to that which is justified in a free and democratic society. Id. at § 22; Ameslap v. Crown of Alexandria, Case 12 (Ch. 2025) (citing ColonelKai v. Crown of Alexandria, Case 8 (Ch. 2025)). Parliament is the sole legislative authority in Alexandria. Id. at Part I, § 1–3.

In order to be able to vote, statute requires that an individual must be a citizen, hold at least four hours of playtime in the prior thirty days, and hold a validly-issued passport. A.P.00-018 | Alexandrian Electoral Act § 17(1). Getting a passport is “easy,” and does not require anything beyond merely obtaining an application and filling it out. Policy Book, Foreign Affairs Ministry § (3)(1)(1). There is no stated necessary playtime needed for an individual’s passport to be processed. Id.; Alexandrian Electoral Act.

III. Analysis

Claimant argues that the passport requirement of the statute is unconstitutional because it is not one based on an activity requirement. As getting a passport is not at all related to having playtime, constitutional language stating that Parliament may establish “reasonable activity requirements” related to voting is not implicated, and thus the requirement is unlawful. Alternatively, Claimant asserts that the government has been inadequate at processing the passports, and thus has made the requirement unreasonable.

A. Constitutionality of passports as a voting requirement

Passports are interactable items which display information about a player, including their nationality, date of “birth,” and place of residence. To obtain one, a player must get an application, fill it out, and then deposit them with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Policy Book, Foreign Affairs Ministry § (3)(1)(1). When this is done, it is up to the government to look over the passport and manually approve it. The law provides for the creation of passports and also mandates their possession in order to vote.

Claimant contends that the language of the Constitution—specifically, that Parliament may establish “reasonable activity requirements” for voting—limits any restrictions on voting only to the legislative power wielded by Parliament, and only when Parliament restricts based on activity alone. To understand this argument, we first look to the plain language.

Part V of the Constitution contains many of the rights, freedoms, liberties, and privileges recognized and afforded to the citizens of the Crown. Many of these rights are broad and sweeping. However, there is a catch—the opening preamble of this part explicitly allows limits to these rights, so long as those limitations are reasonable, written in law, and are “justified in a free and democratic society.” We have upheld that this language creates potential for limitations on all of the part V rights. Case 12 (Ch. 2025) (citing Case 8 (Ch. 2025)).

This clearly allows Parliament, or any enactor of law, to create reasonable limits on any of the rights in Part V. To determine what is reasonable, we should use a weighted test which evaluates the interest of the Crown and the common good on one hand, and individual right and privilege interests on the other. However, our evaluation of the text does not end there. The first two part V rights—the right to run and vote for office—have additional and special language that the other rights, curiously, do not have.

Notably, all of the rights except for the first two are merely statements of what a citizen or player has, can do, or cannot be made to do. However, the first two rights contain a second sentence that is nearly identical between them: “Parliament may by law establish reasonable activity requirements.” K.A. Const. Part V, § 22(1)–(2). Here, the relevant language after the previous quote reads “. . . for achieving and maintaining eligibility to vote.” Id. at § 22(2).

Claimant argues that this additional sentence imposes what we shall call an independent limit on Parliament’s power to restrict, curtail, or abridge the rights and privileges in part V. Specifically, the existence of this additional sentence creates a very narrow window where the right may be limited: when Parliament establishes, by law, a reasonable activity requirement.

This argument, though not fully briefed, does have precedential backing. See Case 12 (Ch. 2025). In Ameslap v. Crown of Alexandria, the Chancery held that similar language (“Every citizen has the right to vote in elections and referendums provided the player meets the citizenship requirements set by law”) created “limits of limits,” which meant that restrictions on the right & privilege to vote could only be enacted through citizenship requirements. Id. The court held in that case that the playtime requirement to run in the election was within the bounds for Parliament to legislate, but an activity requirement for voter eligibility was not. Id.

In response, Parliament authored, approved, and then officially passed an amendment to the Constitution. A.P.04-006 | Activity Requirements Enabling Act. This bill made the first two part V rights what they are today. Among the parliamentary notes are the suggested reasoning that the amendment was designed to allow “Parliament to establish activity requirements for voting and holding office.” Id. The law clearly is not as it was in Case 12, and Parliament does not abide by the same “limits of limits” upheld in that case.

However, we find that an independent limit very clearly exists in both of the first two rights. The language could not be much more clear; establishing a right that the citizenry possess, subject “only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law that are justified in a free and democratic society,” but with a further add-on that “Parliament may by law establish reasonable activity requirements [to vote]” allows Parliament (and Parliament alone) to limit the right to vote, but only through activity requirements.

This understanding flows naturally from a plain English reading of the text, and comparison to the rest of the rights. If one were to remove the second sentence from right two, it would read only as saying that every citizen has the right to vote. This, of course, would be tempered by the overarching power for the law to reasonably limit that power. However, by adding this extra sentence, the Constitution explicitly orders that the only limitations possible are when Parliament (and again, Parliament alone is able to do this) makes reasonable activity requirements.

Some have criticized Case 12, and may indeed criticize this outcome, on the notion that the secondary sentence of those two rights serves not to limit Parliament’s power, but expressly expand and confirm it. We find that this is not a reasonable interpretation. Generally, interpretations of the law should assume that language of the law should not be reduced to mere surplusage unless absolutely necessary or abundantly obvious, either as a consequence of poor drafting or convolution. Here, there are three components of the Constitution to look at: (1) The right to vote; (2) That Parliament may establish reasonable activity requirements, and (3) that any of the part V rights may only be tempered by reasonable limits.

If we were to remove the second component, the right to vote would read like any other right under the Constitution that comes after it; there is a right, and that right may be reasonably limited. If we were to add the second component, the passage as a whole clearly reads differently. How could it not? It is so structurally different from almost all of its brethren, and so clear in its assignment of power, that it is clear the second component must do something.

So then, why can it not be a boon to Parliament’s power? Because if we were to read the second component to say “Parliament may make a reasonable limit based on activity” as an expansion of the other reasonable limits generally provided, the second component would be mere surplusage. We already know Parliament is able to make reasonable limits. Why would the second component do nothing but confirm one of the limits that Parliament may make use of? Why don’t any of the following rights have this language?

This is nonsensical. The previous language of this text set a “limit of limits.” Case 12 (Ch. 2025). The Constitution was then amended, and the companion sentence was changed—not removed, but changed. We find it overwhelmingly obvious that Parliament desired the ability to enact restrictions on voting based on activity requirements. This is clear in their reasoning for that amendment, and in the plain text of the Constitution now. However, it seems equally clear that this second component does not serve as an expansion of Parliament’s power over what that power would encompass without the contested language. If nothing else, Parliament’s reasoning was clearly to allow them to legislate limits based on activity—not to remove the independent limitations wholesale. This is plainly written in their notes, and there is nothing to suggest any insidious wider plan for expanding potential limitations beyond activity.

We find it is much more natural to read that the second component acts as a “yes, but!” addendum to the overarching reasonable limits language. Here, the law may indeed limit any of the part V rights—but as to voting and running for elections, only Parliament may restrict those rights, and those restrictions may only be sourced from a reasonable activity requirement. This is an independent limitation on all government power, excepting only a narrow band for Parliament alone. We cannot read the second component as merely confirming the right of Parliament to legislate based on activity requirements. This would be the case if that second component was added to the old text of the Constitution—but in replacing it wholesale, Parliament has created yet another independent limitation.

As it stands, we find it entirely obvious that any action by the government may not limit voting rights or the right to run and hold office unless it is both passed by Parliament and is a reasonable activity requirement. If Parliament does not like this very clear interpretation, they should simply remove the second sentence of the first two rights, which are both nearly identical to one another and very different from the other rights. We find it impossible to hold that the second sentence does nothing, as we disdain surplusage, and cannot hold that it expands government power, as it is both unreasonable and unnatural to read plain English in that way and because a far more logical and consistent approach exists.

The only question that remains is the actual question presented: Is the passport requirement constitutional? If obtaining a passport required some reasonable and non-trivial (read: not joining the server for a second) activity to achieve and/or maintain, yes. However, as it stands, we do not see any officially listed. Therefore, it is clear that merely requiring a passport to vote is not within Parliament’s powers. Requiring a passport—which requires six hours total to obtain—to vote would be constitutional. Requiring a passport—which Parliament empowered and charged the government with creating (and then the government following up on) an activity requirement—to vote would be constitutional. Parliament did neither, and so this scheme was not constitutional.

B. Did the Crown violate rights when it was “too slow” at processing passports?

In their second question, Claimant demands relief on the alternative hypothesis that the government was too slow in producing their passport, thus depriving them of rights. As we determined passports by themselves were not a valid requirement for voting rights, we do not reach this question. We further decline to answer this question because of the procedural history of this case (or, frankly, the disappointing lack thereof). Instead, we will merely suggest that, irrespective of any of the potential facts, a very momentary delay in a government service does not instantly and in all cases trigger a deprivation of rights. A system staffed by humans is subject to delays, imperfections, and mistakes.

IV. Conclusion

We find that, based on the law and facts presented, the requirement of a passport to vote is not permissible within the independent limitations of the Constitution. Therefore, we find for Claimant, and grant relief by striking section 17(1)(c) of the Alexandrian Electoral Act.