IN THE CHANCERY OF
THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
VERDICT
Chancellor Smallfries writes this Majority opinion, joined by High Chancellor Juniperfig.
In this civil case, Claimant alleges treason, corruption, and in a word, tyranny from the King. These weighty charges—against no less noble a figure than the ceremonial figurehead of our nation himself—begs great attention and the highest scrutiny.
1. Brief Facts
To begin, we must lay before us the issues alleged. King Wackjap I, at his own behest, instituted a Universal Basic Income of £1 per fifteen minutes on April 27, 2025. In the announcement of this Monarchical diktat, the King decreed that "[UBI] is now implemented . . . Truly, my iron reign begins." In a ticket provided by the King, he said he was "going above the government's head" in asking for the action. In a message one day before this action was filed, the King responded to a message from a citizen stating the latter's belief that "so long as [an action similar to what the King did] doesn't happen again it'll probably all be fine," with what can only be described as a caricatured depiction of a mischievous feline fellow, grinning widely as if it knew something we did not. This action followed, and the Claimant's amended complaint seeks relief on three fronts: (1) The immediate withdrawal of the King's UBI order, (2) an "immediate accounting of [the money] injected into the economy," and (3) that the King be burdened with the legal, financial, cultural, and presumably emotional burden of his actions, specifically to repay the totality of money dispensed through UBI due to his decree.
2. Sovereign Immunity
Before we continue our investigation, there is one issue that must be resolved. In an amicus brief filed during proceedings of this case, it was alleged (in not so many words) that the King is in essence immune to all liability civil or criminal due to the "doctrine of sovereign immunity." We find this unconvincing.
Sovereign Immunity is a theory of law that holds, generally, that the State broadly (and the head of State/Government specifically) enjoys legal immunity from the repercussions of their actions and cannot be held accountable by the courts. The brief states that because of this theory's mere existence, the King cannot be held liable. The brief's reasons for stating this claim are, inter alia, that all bodies of government in Alexandria (including this court) exist only because the King expressly limits his power to allow them to, the power of the courts "flows through him," and because he has "absolute authority [as Head] of State."
Sovereign Immunity is widely applied on the world stage. From Ireland to Cathay, states across the globe have instituted Sovereign Immunity to protect their governments or heads of state—Monarchs, in some cases—from suit. The overarching aim of this near-ubiquitous policy is to allow governments to act as necessary in the maintenance of their civilizations, without threat or worry of constant litigation from the populace. There exists, broadly, three categories of the origins of sovereign immunity: constitutional, common law, and Catholic.
First, a great many nations specifically provide within their constitutions that their governments or heads of state are immune from liability, prosecution, or action from the courts. Art. 5 of the Constitution of Norway grants the King immunity, and states that any responsibility rests with council and the government. Article XVI § 3 of the Filipino Constitution holds that the State may not be sued without its consent. Japan, Italy, India, Iceland, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Bhutan, Belgium, Spain, Sweden, and many other states have adopted sovereign immunity in this way. Interestingly, at least one state (Malaysia) has amended their constitution so that the King and State both are able to be tried, abolishing Sovereign Immunity. This fact shows that Sovereign Immunity is not an inherent truth universal to all governments that need be positively disclaimed.
Second, common law jurisdictions (typically those who can trace their political heritage to the Kingdom of England) generally have or had broad Sovereign Immunities, and we believe this is the ideological basis for the arguments forwarded by the Brief. This principle emerged from medieval common law in England, where the courts themselves were created directly by the King. The general understanding that one "cannot bite the hand that feeds them" holds that these courts, directly created by and subservient to the King, had no jurisdiction over him unless he waived this implicit immunity. The United Kingdom, Singapore, the United States, and Canada share this political heritage. Notably, Sovereign Immunity in this context arises from an all-powerful and absolute Sovereign that delegates power to lower authorities (and is adopted by descendent polities). These facts show that Sovereign Immunity in common law tradition requires at the outset an all-powerful Sovereign who consents (or is forced to consent) to shrink their power or waive their privileges in favor of lower bodies that may assert rights or liability upon the Sovereign.
Third, the Holy See grants Sovereign Immunity upon the Pope, the Bishop of Rome. This origin, though an interesting footnote of international relations, is not in any way relevant to our situation.
Thus, we must look between the two remaining origins to determine if the theory of Sovereign Immunity exists at this moment. We find it does not. Upon simple observation, it is quite clear that our Constitution does not carve any protection out for the State generally or King specifically, so the first origin does not give the King safe harbor. As to the second, we do not descend politically from the Kingdom of England. Though true that a great many individuals in Alexandria may have their origins in polities descended politically from the Kingdom of England, that does not necessarily create political lineage.
For true political lineage to take hold, a nation’s political (and judicial) systems must grow as a subset of a nation beholden to English common law tradition—and adhere to that tradition—before obtaining independence. All nations that practice under the English common-law heritage have real, tangible, undeniable political origins that can be traced directly back to the stony shores of Albion, whereas Alexandria was founded suddenly as an independent nation with no prior law holding jurisdiction upon our free soil. The only law that had, has, and by the grace of Tech ever will hold power over the teeming shores of Alexandria are those under the Alexandrian Constitution.
It cannot be denied that this judiciary is the first and original judiciary of Alexandria. Because of this, even if it was somehow true that Alexandria was an independent offshoot with a political history and real material heritage traceable to the Kingdom of England, our refusal to follow this set tradition here today firmly dissolves any pretenses of Sovereign Immunity belonging to the King as an unstated necessity. As a matter of law, the King does not enjoy any sort of immunity from suit at this time.
The justifications raised by the Brief are, in a word, irrational. It must be firmly stated: No, this court’s authority, power, and jurisdiction most certainly do not flow from the King. Parliament itself is similarly independent of the King. The King did not once rule supreme, has never held supreme political power or authority, and has certainly not “relinquished” any powers as a result of our Constitution. Indeed, a brief look at history obviously shows that our Constitution in fact pre-dates the King.
The Constitution was unveiled on January 9, 2025, as the constitution of the “Republic of Alexandria.” This Old Republic was for a time the legal and legitimate body of Alexandria, before legitimately changing to the Kingdom of Alexandria on January 17, 2025, by staff decree. Though difficult to ascertain the exact date when the idea of a Monarch was floated or when our current King was chosen (some have indicated the 11th and 16th of January, respectively), this is not necessary.
It is irrefutable that Alexandria was once a republic. The Old Republic had no King, but did have a constitution—the same original document that has been amended into our current Constitution. They are, quite literally, the same document. At one point the Constitution did not have a King, and now it does. The obvious conclusion any sensible person could come to with this knowledge is that the Old Republic (which pre-dated the Kingdom) had as its founding document the same document we use today for the basis of our law.
Thus, our Constitution pre-dating the existence of a King, we can firmly say with unrelenting certainty and unwavering resolve that no King “granted” our nation the rights, liberties, and political processes we enjoy today. Even mandated by staff that the transition between the Old Republic and the Kingdom endured a break in legal continuity, it could only be said that the Throne, the Courts, and the Parliament came into existence at the same moment. The King was not in any way involved with the Constitution, and no proof has presented even of his signing or promulgating it officially—not that this action would help his case.
As a matter of fact, the King did not pre-date the Constitution or this court, and thus surely could have ever had any unchecked or otherwise supreme authority which he delegates now to this court, subservient to him. In all manner of speaking, the King is surely no more than a Citizen, entrusted with the responsibility of signing bills to pass into law, and very little else. The Throne should be respected, as should the individual who sits upon it—but they are not Sovereign, and they are not immune from the consequences of our action.
3. Discussion
With this short adventure out of the way, we may proceed to the true bounty of this case. Claimant references the crimes of Treason and Corruption in his amended complaint, though they have removed a relevant request for relief from their complaint. See Cl.’s amended complaint. We address this first. Further, Claimant’s surviving requests for relief ask for (1) the allegedly improper UBI to be reverted by this court, (2) the totality of all monies to be calculated by the Ministry of Trade and Finance, and (3) that the King be considered responsible for inflation and be burdened with the cost of repaying the total amount paid out to the public. We address these in turn.
I. The King is not liable for any crimes as a result of these proceedings
We believe that the Claimant intends to “charge” the King with these crimes. The fact should be noted that only a Court of Alexandria or the Government—through the appropriate ministry—may allege criminal wrongdoing in a court of law. See A.P. 003. However, a criminal allegation may be levied in a civil court by victims of that alleged crime so long as damages of that crime are proven in court. Id. at § 3(4). Here, the alleged crimes of Treason and Corruption both have a similar stem: “The act of abusing or attempting to abuse a government position to [do something.]” The elements of both are clear: (1) An act abusing, or attempting to abuse, must occur that (2) abuses or attempts to abuse a government office in order to (3)(a) for the former, undermine the stability, security, or sovereignty of the nation for Treason, or (3)(b) for the latter, create some private gain, and that action is inconsistent with official duties of the position.
For our analysis, we wish to discover if we could simply discard either or both charges of civil liability through an obvious failure of one of the elements through a balance of probabilities. See Writ P.P. I (Ch. 2025). We believe that as to the first two elements of either alleged crime, reasonable minds could conclude that the elements have been made out in this case. However, the final specific element of each alleged crime cannot be reasonably said to be made out.
For Treason, the third element demands that the officeholder, in the course of their employment, acted or attempted to act in a way using their office “to undermine the stability, security, or sovereignty” of the nation. The important question is this: What does “to” mean? Does “to” mean “in order to?” Does “to” mean “that causes”? Does “to” mean some secret third option? The legislature is silent on this issue, and this ambiguous wording creates issues.
Here, we hold that “to” means “that causes.” The primary difference between “in order to” and “that causes” is the importance of intent, or the mens rea (loosely: state of mind) of the alleged wrongdoer. “In order to” implies that an individual undertook an act with the express desire—and thus, intent—to cause a specific result. Conversely, “that causes” implies that regardless of what the actor thought would happen, an act causing that result places liability upon them. Here, with no definitions to clear up the ambiguous language, we look to the surrounding legislation in pari materia.
After a quick investigation, we see several other crimes within the same act holding the word “intentionally.” We presume that Parliament assembled knowingly and intentionally used their vocabulary to construct this bill. With this in mind, we hold that because Parliament used the word “intentionally” in some crimes but not in others, those crimes which do not use the word “intentionally” are intended to be crimes of strict liability, or in another word, should have an evaluation of an alleged wrongdoer of that crime not weigh intent. We conclude similarly with Corruption, replacing “to” with “for” and reaching the same conclusion.
Thus, the question here is whether the King undermined the stability, security, or the sovereignty of the Kingdom with his actions, or did he receive a private gain. The answer to the first is surely no, and we discard this claim. To answer the second, we must dive once again into etymology.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “private” as “(1) Of, relating to, or involving an individual, as opposed to the public or government.” Black’s, 12th Ed. (Irrelevant definitions omitted). The Cambridge dictionary similarly defines “private” as either “Only for one person or group and not for everyone,” or “for the use of or belonging to one particular person or group only, or not shared or available to other people.” The Claimant contends that “private” here should mean any benefit an alleged Corrupt individual gains from their office. We disagree.
Once again, we turn to statutory canon to interpret ambiguous language. Our old friend from the “to/for” discussion returns, and he gestures vaguely at “private gain,” suggesting we remove “private” and see what happens. Doing so, we see that under Claimant’s interpretation “private gain” and “gain” have no discernible difference. A politician passing a tax cut that impacts everyone, including herself, would both privately gain and simply gain under this interpretation. As we wish to believe Parliament knew what it was doing and intended each word to have meaning and for no word or phrase to be simple surplusage, we reject this interpretation.
The word “private,” especially in the context of a corruption charge, has a certain meaning that must be respected. This meaning surely does not allow for any benefit granted to an officeholder by their own actions to be theoretically prosecutable, even if that action was “inconsistent” in some way with their official duties. Therefore, we adopt the definition used by the Black’s and Cambridge dictionaries above, and hold that a “private gain” is one that generally involves a gain granted to an individual or restricted group, as opposed to the public or government. This is clearly not the case, as the Universal Basic Income is universal, and applies without exception to all individuals within the borders of Alexandria.
We dismiss the alleged criminal liability of the King in this matter. It should be noted that just as a finding of his criminal liability in this civil matter would not render him automatically criminally liable, so too does a failure to find him civilly liable not immediately or inevitably clear him in any possible criminal suit in this matter. At this time, we find the evidence presented unreasonable to establish civil liability of this alleged offense.
II. Parliament has since passed UBI into law, and the King was in the wrong to make his declaration
Since the filing of this complaint, Parliament has passed UBI into law. See A.P. 017. Claimant here asks that the UBI policy instituted by the King be removed. We find this relief impossible, and so we dismiss it. More interestingly, the obvious question posed here is was the King within his legal rights to—by fiat—institute UBI without Parliamentary approval? We are not convinced he was.
Relevant to policy or actions that impact the livelihood of the Kingdom generally, the powers of the Monarch are listed in full under Article 19 of the Constitution. K. A. Const. § IV Art. 19. The Monarch is entrusted with, inter alia, representing the Kingdom in ceremonial functions, granting royal assent to bills passed, and having an “Advisory Role” not to be used to exert influence over political decisions. The power for a Monarch to make declarations that by their very utterance change matters of public policy are not listed or seemingly implied, but this does not mean the King does not have the ability or power to act in ways not specifically prescribed by the Constitution.
The power of legislating and managing the budget and finances are prescribed solely to the Parliament of Alexandria. See id. at § I Art. 1–2. These include spending and taxation policies. Id. Further, a constitutional responsibility of Parliament is to be a forum for debating and resolving national issues. Id. at Art. 2(9).
It is conceivable that an individual may undertake tasks delegated to their branch, without being given explicit permission from Parliament via statute to do so. This is not necessarily unconstitutional. The King, for example, may desire to Royally Assent a bill, though Parliament has not spoken on the matter. Is the King allowed to write their approval in a foreign language? Do they need to be super serious, or can they post a funny joke? Can they just post a thumbs up and lock the page? Or, instead, do they have to sit and wait for Parliament to take their hand and guide them towards completion?
Imagine there is a task the King is called to carry out. With no explicit instructions to complete this constitutionally mandated function, we see no reason to deny them the ability to fulfill these duties in, broadly speaking, any reasonably prudent and efficient manner they believe necessary so long as that path does not otherwise run contrary to the law or other constitutional provisions. Generally, a function assigned to an entity within the Constitution or other law may generally be assumed to be authorized to act reasonably and pragmatically to complete that task so long as the means to the end do not break any other laws or legal principles.
Here, the King is called to do a very specific list of tasks. Under which of the King’s prescribed responsibilities did he carry out this fiat act? We do not know, as he never says. Our best guess is that he found his constitutional authority at the end of his laundry list of powers. See Id. at § IV Art. 19(7) It is perhaps conceivable that one would interpret “While the Monarch’s role is largely ceremonial . . .” to mean that among the basket of powers a Monarch has, he also has some unburdened and non-ceremonial power that grants him the ability to unilaterally decree a change of the nation’s financial and economic situation at whim.
We find this belief unconvincing. The beginning of section four clearly states the Monarch holds “strictly limited ceremonial powers and functions.” This does not necessarily make the above position false, but it does weigh heavily against a presumption of unknown and unspecified real powers, especially in the realm of finance or economics—areas specifically given to Parliament earlier in the text.
There is not much more to say on this topic, and we have already given this far more thought than the King. The above was not listed in any filings produced by the King, and so we are not even sure if that was the rationale behind the King’s actions. The King never testified or gave any affidavit as to his thought processes, and so barring our above potential rationale, we have no way to defend the King’s actions even in a light most favorable to him.
As far as we know, the King’s only rationale that he had the authority to act as he did was because he personally felt like it should be done. In his closing statement, the King claims “The people were clamoring for any form of UBI . . . The King simply stepped in to meet their demands . . . The King [was] permitted to do so [because] this was an exceptional measure [used] for the good of his people and the nation.” The annals of history are filled with great men doing what they believed was best in a tense moment for the good of those around them, but this benevolent intent does not circumvent the law.
The King asks: Does no good deed go unpunished? We are not prepared to answer that question as a matter of law. We are, however, prepared to answer if any unconstitutional deed may go unpunished. The answer, clearly, is no. The King had no legal authority (and indeed has cited none) to show he was within his rights, responsibilities, and duties as Monarch of Alexandria.
Finally, we do not accept the excuse that the use of a “trollface cat” is exculpatory or diminishing in any way. It is obvious some humor was intended with those messages, but we are not so blind as to disregard plain, ordinary, and obvious meaning. We in the court are highly educated and versed in internet terminology and culture, and are more than aware of the memetic background of a trollface. Simply put: we are not convinced that the King’s use of a trollface meant it was purely joking in nature, and that an accompanied statement that the King “would do it again” (“it” here presumed to be some policy action that goes straight past Parliament, likely of a similarly fiat nature) did not actually mean he would do it again.
The court believes that when someone tells you who they are, you should believe them. Words mean things, and when a government official threatens to potentially abuse their power in a very real way (in the same way that they have allegedly abused in the past) there is a very real and rational reason to be alarmed. Thus, we do not handwave the trollface cat and accompanying posts as mere jokes. The King saying he would abolish Parliament if someone did not give him a chicken is outlandish and dismissable as a mere joke, especially if he did not have a history of doing such a thing. The King engaging in a controversial act, and then saying he would do so again, is a much different story.
Thus, we believe the King acted far beyond his bounds of constitutional power and authority not only because the King specifically is presumed to have their abilities heavily constrained, but because the action he took was not a means to one of the ends assigned to him, and it was also a power directly and specifically assigned to Parliament. Further, we do not discount his actions because we think he was just being silly. It is reasonable to believe that the King’s posts were serious, even if they were cloaked in sardonic irony, and that he possessed a genuine interest in potentially committing a similar action.
As an aside, Claimant could have asked for emergency relief in forcing the King’s policy to be put on hold barring investigation, and we would have weighed it properly, and perhaps granted it. The Claimant’s failure to do so is their own. We do not seek to rush a verdict to grant relief if the Claimant themselves do seem to believe that the subject of the emergency relief is damaging enough to warrant a proper entreaty. We ask future Advocates to keep this in mind.
III. Even if the Crown were a party to this case, the requested relief is an entirely new action unprescribed by law that we cannot grant
In his second claim for relief, Claimant asks that we direct the Government to engage in a total accounting for every pound given during the period in which the King’s (now recognized as illegitimate) was in force. Put bluntly, we will not do this.
First, the Crown is not a party to this case. If person A sues person B for a broken contract, it would not make sense to pin the financial burden on person C—unmentioned in the contract and unrelated in any financial or contractual way in this scenario—in any outcome. Likewise, in order to secure relief from a party not involved in a case, that party must be in some way responsible for the defeated party, must be the current holder of assets of the defeated party, or have Parliament authorizing recovery from that third party. Seeing none here, the Government cannot be held liable for the King’s actions acting on his own behest.
Even if the above were not the case, accounting for the entirety of all UBI granted is not currently a policy or law enacted by the Government or Parliament. For the same reason that the King was illegitimate in exercising his power to directly and intentionally alter the financial or economic situation of Alexandria, so too would we be in the wrong were we to direct the Government to undertake such an action as proposed by Claimant. In not so many words: Parliament has financial power explicitly outlined in the Constitution as their realm, and we do not. We cannot and shall not create new duties, responsibilities, and powers for Parliament in this sphere. This is the proper limit of our branch of Government’s power, and we do not seek to cross it.
Because the Claimant did not properly include the party impacted by this claim of relief in the legislation, nor is it proper for us to grant barring a law from Parliament, we reject this claim for relief.
IV. We will not hold the King personally responsible for any theorized inflation, nor hold him personally financially responsible
For reasons similar to those in the second claim of relief, we do not grant the third. This extraordinary claim for relief asks us to impose thousands, perhaps even tens or hundreds of thousands of pounds upon the King himself as a form of community service. As stated, the limit of authority in the realm of financial power bars any non-Parliamentary authority from inventing new duties, responsibilities, or powers unless explicitly authorized by Parliament.
With this not having been done, we do not see fit at this time to burden the King in this way. Even if we could do so, we would have no idea where to start; the Claimant has not given us a figure to work with, has not called Parliament or any other expert to testify to the matter, and there does not appear to be any appetite in Parliament to pursue the matter. We see no reason to embark on such an austerity crusade ourselves, so we put the matter to rest here.
Additionally, to be considered “responsible” is a task the public at large alone can undertake. This court does not have original jurisdiction over popular sentiment, and it is only the Court of Public Opinion that can hold any person socially responsible for a deed—regardless of the facts. This is all to say, we cannot mandate that the public believe the King is responsible for some abstract act, especially when we do not find him factually or legally responsible.
4. Conclusion
The King is not immune from prosecution, be it civil or criminal. Because it does not seem that the King created instability in Alexandria or privately gained from his action as far as we can tell, we do not hold him Civilly liable for the alleged crimes. Because Parliament has since passed a UBI into law, there is no action we can take to satisfy the Claimant’s first claim of relief—though we acknowledge he was acting outside of his bounds of authority, and believe he was serious in his alleged admission that he would do so again. Finally, with the Crown not being a party in this matter and with the Constitution expressly limiting financial powers to Parliament, we deny Claimant’s request to direct the Government to begin accounting for all UBI granted as a result of the King’s actions, as well as holding him personally or financially responsible for them.
As a final note, we ask all future Advocates to plainly and clearly list first your alleged grievances against a Respondent (here, perhaps: (1) The King did the UBI directive illegally, (2) the King introduced a great amount of money into the system and caused inflation, and (3) the King committed treason) followed up by a correlating list of claims for relief, those items you wish for us to grant you should you win. (Here, in order: (1) Reverse the King’s UBI directive, (2) demand the Government account for and then hold the King financially responsible, and (3) Hold the King criminally responsible for treason.)
We thank both parties for their involvement, attention, diligence, and patience in this matter, and are honored to have ruled here. This case is now closed.