Lawsuit: In Session Ref. Rights Collective v Crown, Case 11 (Ch. 2025)

In agreement, the Chancery sustains Rule 1 to this case. High Chancellor AsexualDinosaur is assigned as presiding officer.

@SoggehToast / @Capt11543
Please let the court know the person(s) handling this case.

The Crown will have 72 hours to respond with their opening statements​
 
IN THE HONOURABLE CHANCERY
OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
CIVIL ACTION

Case No. 11

Referendum Rights Collective

v.

The Crown
​
Entreaty for Writ of Summary Judgement

Your honour,

As it currently stands, The Crown has not given the court notice of who opposing counsel is, nor have they filed their opening statement, nor have they asked for any extension of the deadline to file their opening statement.

In the interest of preserving the constitutional right of a speedy trial, the Plaintiffs wish to ask this court to offer a summary judgement based on the uncontested facts currently established by this case.

This case has lasted through three different administrations, it is in the interest of the Kingdom and in Justice to finally see this issue put to rest.


Respectfully submitted to the Chancery,
PhillinDeBlanc
On behalf of the Referendum Rights Collective
Dated: November 27, 2025
 
Recognizing that both @Capt11543 and @SoggehToast are plaintiffs in this case - I have been informed there is only one other member of the MOJ that could possibly handle this case on their side of things.


I find it somewhat perplexing as to why the government of whom the Prime Minister is Capt. and the MoJ Minister is SoggehToast, and a number of the plaintiffs in this case are sitting Parliamentary members - Have not implemented measures to facilitate this, or seemingly made efforts to settle with themselves.


That said, the court is going to summon @ColonelKai to the case, as the Solicitor General of the MoJ and of whom is NOT a plaintiff in this case.


Please inform the court of whom is handling this case.
That person will then:
1. Respond to the entreaty for Summary judgement.
2. Provide an opening statement if applicable.


To be clear, this court is not going to rule on a summary judgement simply because the MoJ of whom is largely composed of plaintiffs in this matter, doesn't show up.​
 
Date.16/12/2025
Docket. 11 Ch.2025​

IN THE HONOURABLE CHANCERY
OF THE SOVEREIGN KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA​

BETWEEN
Referendum Rights Collective​
⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀Applicants​

v.
the Crown​
RESPONSE TO COURT
If it may please the court,


As the only qualified member of the Ministry who does not have a Conflict of Interest in the case, I shall be undertaking the representation for the crown in this case going forward.

As the actions leading to the "Entreaty for Writ of Summary Judgement" were not within my responsibilities or knowledge and thus I cannot provide any explanation as to them, we believe that there is perhaps a marginal benefit in the continuation of this case on the question of law. If anything, the plaintiff consenting, we would not oppose to a summary judgement after we have been granted the opportunity to respond to their arguments made in their statement, as I do not know how much additional context could be added in closing statements.

That being said, we do not hardline oppose a summary judgement, and largely concur with the arguments made by our former counsel Ibney.

This case has gone on for long enough.​

SIGNED. Sec. ColonelKai. Solicitor General
Office of Litigation, 5601 MoJ Building, New Hamilton
This 16th of December 2025.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO THE CHANCELLERY FOR REVIEW.
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ColonelKai said:
Date.16/12/2025
Docket. 11 Ch.2025​

IN THE HONOURABLE CHANCERY
OF THE SOVEREIGN KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA​

BETWEEN
Referendum Rights Collective​
⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀Applicants​

v.
the Crown​
RESPONSE TO COURT
If it may please the court,


As the only qualified member of the Ministry who does not have a Conflict of Interest in the case, I shall be undertaking the representation for the crown in this case going forward.

As the actions leading to the "Entreaty for Writ of Summary Judgement" were not within my responsibilities or knowledge and thus I cannot provide any explanation as to them, we believe that there is perhaps a marginal benefit in the continuation of this case on the question of law. If anything, the plaintiff consenting, we would not oppose to a summary judgement after we have been granted the opportunity to respond to their arguments made in their statement, as I do not know how much additional context could be added in closing statements.

That being said, we do not hardline oppose a summary judgement, and largely concur with the arguments made by our former counsel Ibney.

This case has gone on for long enough.​

SIGNED. Sec. ColonelKai. Solicitor General
Office of Litigation, 5601 MoJ Building, New Hamilton
This 16th of December 2025.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO THE CHANCELLERY FOR REVIEW.
chablink.gif
Click to expand...
I will permit counsel to provide opening statements, they will have 48 hours to do so.
If you require additional time, please inform the court.

We will accept the entreaty for summary judgement once the opening statements are filed.

@ColonelKai / @PhillinDeBlanc​
 
Date.18/12/2025
Docket. 11 Ch.2025​

IN THE HONOURABLE CHANCERY
OF THE SOVEREIGN KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA​

BETWEEN
Referendum Rights Collective​
⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀Applicants​

v.
the Crown​
OPENING STATEMENT
1. The plaintiff has made many statements and many claims, such as "This case is about the sanctity of the ballot box and the rule of law. ... and its obstruction of a statutory duty owed to the citizenry.", "... and struck at the heart of democratic legitimacy in Alexandria.", "... the Crown so heinously violated the constitutional and civil rights of all Alexandrians by effectively declaring, “givsies backsies” and “no fair I don’t like that” in the middle of the vote like toddlers, ..." (see. 11 Ch. 2025, Plaintiff Opening Statement), many of which are heavily charged in their language, emotionally and narratively grandiose, to paint a context in which the circumstances seem so dire that an equally grandiose address is necessary by our courts. Quite a bit of this text is void of any actual legal argumentation, and simply writes as if to idealise a utopia. One of the worst offenders, one that has such a heavy ideal and yet mean so little, is in their claim for a constitutional right violation. The plaintiff claims “The right to vote is not merely the right to cast a ballot, but the right to have that vote be meaningful, binding, and respected under the law." This is a weird, compounded claim, and another example of the colourful language. What does this sentence mean? For a sentence that constitutes one of their three claims for relief, it is obtrusively vague. "meaningful, binding and respected under the law." In the most charitable explanation means, that within the bounds of statute, the votes should be meaningful (as in bring about consequences) binding, (as in bring about consequences), and respected, (as in bring about consequences). We do not argue against the notion that if there is statute that allows for votes to have bring about consequence, they should bring about consequence. This is meaningless.
2. Alas, as with many situations akin to this, the reality is much more boring. There was both an act overly vague in authorizing a stimulus check to the MoTF, and another act in which the parliament bound itself to comply to referendum results. Neither were without controversy. When the MoTF did not authorise the stimulus check, as the act required, the plaintiffs lawfully started a referendum, which if passed, would be binding to require that the MoTF authorise the stimulus check. In the meantime, a change in composition and ideals within the Parliament had occured, and the new parliament, possibly not wishing to issue stimulus checks nor engage in direct democracy, repealed both.
3. Therefore, the case boils down to two core questions; "Was the MoTF or the executive at large required to issue Stimulus acts by default?" (Also see; 11 Ch. 2025, Plaintiff Opening Statement # Question 1.) and "Does a binding referendum whose enabling act was removed mid-referendum still bind the Parliament?" (Also see; 11 Ch. 2025, Plaintiff Opening Statement # Questions 2 and 3.)

WAS THE MOTF OR THE EXECUTIVE AT LARGE REQUIRED TO ISSUE STIMULUS ACTS BY DEFAULT?
4. We largely concur with the argument made by our former colleague Ibney and his arguments, and we do not believe in the state the Act was passed, the MoTF was bound to authorise the Stimulus Acts at any specific time.​
It was "on approval of the Minister of Trade and Finance." This requirement destroys any claim the plaintiff may have. Under the plaintiffs theory, when exactly was the Minister suppose to approve the stimulus checks? Immediately once the law passed, thus disbursing no funds? When a certain number of individuals requested them not specified by the act? Any required disbursement point under the act is entirely arbitrary, and thus the determination falls upon the Minister of Trade and Finance. If the decision is entirely the decision of the Minister of Trade and Finance, it is entirely their decision to make at any time they see fit, so long as it does not violate the law.
Click to expand...
(see. 11 Ch. 2025 ENTREATY OF WRIT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT)

DOES A BINDING REFERENDUM WHOSE ENABLING ACT WAS REMOVED MID-REFERENDUM STILL BIND THE PARLIAMENT?
5. We first and foremost reiterate the point of our former colleague Ibney that a repeal of a law, unless dissolving a constitutionally required implementation cannot be illegal. The constitution does give the people the right to vote in referendums, but in no way does it specify that they should be implemented or in which form.
6. We, just as the plaintiffs, are in agreement, that the enabling act of the referendum was removed shortly before the final results were announced and when the referendum would have become binding. For the referendum to be binding after the act's repeal would mean that the referendum would act with the rules set at the time of the start of the referendum. This is the main claim of the plaintiff, that the referendum should act within its confines of the rules which were set at its beginning. The logical consequence of such an argument is that the referendum is, and all referendums were, independent legal creatures above the statute in which it was defined. This may be the case for constitution-borne processes, but as our former colleague Ibney has put it, "referendums are creatures of statute". The constitution neither requires the existence of, or mandate a specific implementation for referendums. Referendums are seldom used in common times, and almost never in a direct-democracy role as was the case for the time in which the act was in place. To imply that the existence of the word within the constitution would lead to mean the specific implementation and thus raise it to a higher order process is simply unfounded.
7. Even if it were so that the law was repealed after the result of the referendum, if we look at the referendum for what it is rather than the higher order process as the plaintiffs put it, a repeal would still nullify its binding. As our former colleague Ibney has stated, binding referendum results are a responsibility which the parliament imposes on itself. By passing a law the parliament created, they have put a rule on themselves that they shall obey. The plaintiff uses such language as that the applicants had "reasonable expectation" that the referendum would be implemented. Does this mean that once there is public participation, expectation or reliance on a parliamentarily imposed responsibility on the parliament, that it may not be revoked? How would this affect budget laws, criminal laws, election laws? We reiterate the point made in 5. We stress parliamentary supremacy.
8. This is by no means a statement on the ethics of the action taken by the Parliament. While the repeal’s timing may be politically controversial, courts do not adjudicate legislative motive absent constitutional prohibition. This should have, and should be, a political question rather than a legal one. Expectations do matter as compelling arguments in constructing the motives for a crime or evaluating a reasonable belief test. Not what the politicians do with their policies. One would reasonably expect that a politician should serve the good of the people. Unfortunately, you cant sue them for not doing so.​

SIGNED. Sec. ColonelKai. Solicitor General
Office of Litigation, 5601 MoJ Building, New Hamilton
This 18th of December 2025.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO THE CHANCELLERY FOR REVIEW.
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Unless there are any objections to the matter, the court will recess pending verdict without hearing closing statements.​
 
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