Lawsuit: Adjourned Ref. Rights Collective v Crown, Case 11 (Ch. 2025)

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In agreement, the Chancery sustains Rule 1 to this case. High Chancellor AsexualDinosaur is assigned as presiding officer.

@SoggehToast / @Capt11543
Please let the court know the person(s) handling this case.

The Crown will have 72 hours to respond with their opening statements​
 
IN THE HONOURABLE CHANCERY
OF THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
CIVIL ACTION

Case No.
11

Referendum Rights Collective

v.

The Crown
Entreaty for Writ of Summary Judgement

Your honour,

As it currently stands, The Crown has not given the court notice of who opposing counsel is, nor have they filed their opening statement, nor have they asked for any extension of the deadline to file their opening statement.

In the interest of preserving the constitutional right of a speedy trial, the Plaintiffs wish to ask this court to offer a summary judgement based on the uncontested facts currently established by this case.

This case has lasted through three different administrations, it is in the interest of the Kingdom and in Justice to finally see this issue put to rest.


Respectfully submitted to the Chancery,
PhillinDeBlanc
On behalf of the Referendum Rights Collective
Dated: November 27, 2025
 
Recognizing that both @Capt11543 and @SoggehToast are plaintiffs in this case - I have been informed there is only one other member of the MOJ that could possibly handle this case on their side of things.


I find it somewhat perplexing as to why the government of whom the Prime Minister is Capt. and the MoJ Minister is SoggehToast, and a number of the plaintiffs in this case are sitting Parliamentary members - Have not implemented measures to facilitate this, or seemingly made efforts to settle with themselves.


That said, the court is going to summon @ColonelKai to the case, as the Solicitor General of the MoJ and of whom is NOT a plaintiff in this case.


Please inform the court of whom is handling this case.
That person will then:
1. Respond to the entreaty for Summary judgement.
2. Provide an opening statement if applicable.


To be clear, this court is not going to rule on a summary judgement simply because the MoJ of whom is largely composed of plaintiffs in this matter, doesn't show up.​
 
Date.16/12/2025
Docket. 11 Ch.2025​

IN THE HONOURABLE CHANCERY
OF THE SOVEREIGN KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA​

BETWEEN
Referendum Rights Collective​
⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀Applicants

v.
the Crown​
RESPONSE TO COURT
If it may please the court,


As the only qualified member of the Ministry who does not have a Conflict of Interest in the case, I shall be undertaking the representation for the crown in this case going forward.

As the actions leading to the "Entreaty for Writ of Summary Judgement" were not within my responsibilities or knowledge and thus I cannot provide any explanation as to them, we believe that there is perhaps a marginal benefit in the continuation of this case on the question of law. If anything, the plaintiff consenting, we would not oppose to a summary judgement after we have been granted the opportunity to respond to their arguments made in their statement, as I do not know how much additional context could be added in closing statements.

That being said, we do not hardline oppose a summary judgement, and largely concur with the arguments made by our former counsel Ibney.

This case has gone on for long enough.​

SIGNED. Sec. ColonelKai. Solicitor General
Office of Litigation, 5601 MoJ Building, New Hamilton
This 16th of December 2025.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO THE CHANCELLERY FOR REVIEW.
chablink.gif
 
Date.16/12/2025
Docket. 11 Ch.2025​

IN THE HONOURABLE CHANCERY
OF THE SOVEREIGN KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA​

BETWEEN
Referendum Rights Collective​
⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀Applicants

v.
the Crown​
RESPONSE TO COURT
If it may please the court,


As the only qualified member of the Ministry who does not have a Conflict of Interest in the case, I shall be undertaking the representation for the crown in this case going forward.

As the actions leading to the "Entreaty for Writ of Summary Judgement" were not within my responsibilities or knowledge and thus I cannot provide any explanation as to them, we believe that there is perhaps a marginal benefit in the continuation of this case on the question of law. If anything, the plaintiff consenting, we would not oppose to a summary judgement after we have been granted the opportunity to respond to their arguments made in their statement, as I do not know how much additional context could be added in closing statements.

That being said, we do not hardline oppose a summary judgement, and largely concur with the arguments made by our former counsel Ibney.

This case has gone on for long enough.​

SIGNED. Sec. ColonelKai. Solicitor General
Office of Litigation, 5601 MoJ Building, New Hamilton
This 16th of December 2025.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO THE CHANCELLERY FOR REVIEW.
chablink.gif
I will permit counsel to provide opening statements, they will have 48 hours to do so.
If you require additional time, please inform the court.

We will accept the entreaty for summary judgement once the opening statements are filed.

@ColonelKai / @PhillinDeBlanc
 
Date.18/12/2025
Docket. 11 Ch.2025

IN THE HONOURABLE CHANCERY
OF THE SOVEREIGN KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA

BETWEEN
Referendum Rights Collective
⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀Applicants

v.
the Crown
OPENING STATEMENT
1. The plaintiff has made many statements and many claims, such as "This case is about the sanctity of the ballot box and the rule of law. ... and its obstruction of a statutory duty owed to the citizenry.", "... and struck at the heart of democratic legitimacy in Alexandria.", "... the Crown so heinously violated the constitutional and civil rights of all Alexandrians by effectively declaring, “givsies backsies” and “no fair I don’t like that” in the middle of the vote like toddlers, ..." (see. 11 Ch. 2025, Plaintiff Opening Statement), many of which are heavily charged in their language, emotionally and narratively grandiose, to paint a context in which the circumstances seem so dire that an equally grandiose address is necessary by our courts. Quite a bit of this text is void of any actual legal argumentation, and simply writes as if to idealise a utopia. One of the worst offenders, one that has such a heavy ideal and yet mean so little, is in their claim for a constitutional right violation. The plaintiff claims “The right to vote is not merely the right to cast a ballot, but the right to have that vote be meaningful, binding, and respected under the law." This is a weird, compounded claim, and another example of the colourful language. What does this sentence mean? For a sentence that constitutes one of their three claims for relief, it is obtrusively vague. "meaningful, binding and respected under the law." In the most charitable explanation means, that within the bounds of statute, the votes should be meaningful (as in bring about consequences) binding, (as in bring about consequences), and respected, (as in bring about consequences). We do not argue against the notion that if there is statute that allows for votes to have bring about consequence, they should bring about consequence. This is meaningless.
2. Alas, as with many situations akin to this, the reality is much more boring. There was both an act overly vague in authorizing a stimulus check to the MoTF, and another act in which the parliament bound itself to comply to referendum results. Neither were without controversy. When the MoTF did not authorise the stimulus check, as the act required, the plaintiffs lawfully started a referendum, which if passed, would be binding to require that the MoTF authorise the stimulus check. In the meantime, a change in composition and ideals within the Parliament had occured, and the new parliament, possibly not wishing to issue stimulus checks nor engage in direct democracy, repealed both.
3. Therefore, the case boils down to two core questions; "Was the MoTF or the executive at large required to issue Stimulus acts by default?" (Also see; 11 Ch. 2025, Plaintiff Opening Statement # Question 1.) and "Does a binding referendum whose enabling act was removed mid-referendum still bind the Parliament?" (Also see; 11 Ch. 2025, Plaintiff Opening Statement # Questions 2 and 3.)

WAS THE MOTF OR THE EXECUTIVE AT LARGE REQUIRED TO ISSUE STIMULUS ACTS BY DEFAULT?
4. We largely concur with the argument made by our former colleague Ibney and his arguments, and we do not believe in the state the Act was passed, the MoTF was bound to authorise the Stimulus Acts at any specific time.
It was "on approval of the Minister of Trade and Finance." This requirement destroys any claim the plaintiff may have. Under the plaintiffs theory, when exactly was the Minister suppose to approve the stimulus checks? Immediately once the law passed, thus disbursing no funds? When a certain number of individuals requested them not specified by the act? Any required disbursement point under the act is entirely arbitrary, and thus the determination falls upon the Minister of Trade and Finance. If the decision is entirely the decision of the Minister of Trade and Finance, it is entirely their decision to make at any time they see fit, so long as it does not violate the law.
(see. 11 Ch. 2025 ENTREATY OF WRIT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT)

DOES A BINDING REFERENDUM WHOSE ENABLING ACT WAS REMOVED MID-REFERENDUM STILL BIND THE PARLIAMENT?

5. We first and foremost reiterate the point of our former colleague Ibney that a repeal of a law, unless dissolving a constitutionally required implementation cannot be illegal. The constitution does give the people the right to vote in referendums, but in no way does it specify that they should be implemented or in which form.
6. We, just as the plaintiffs, are in agreement, that the enabling act of the referendum was removed shortly before the final results were announced and when the referendum would have become binding. For the referendum to be binding after the act's repeal would mean that the referendum would act with the rules set at the time of the start of the referendum. This is the main claim of the plaintiff, that the referendum should act within its confines of the rules which were set at its beginning. The logical consequence of such an argument is that the referendum is, and all referendums were, independent legal creatures above the statute in which it was defined. This may be the case for constitution-borne processes, but as our former colleague Ibney has put it, "referendums are creatures of statute". The constitution neither requires the existence of, or mandate a specific implementation for referendums. Referendums are seldom used in common times, and almost never in a direct-democracy role as was the case for the time in which the act was in place. To imply that the existence of the word within the constitution would lead to mean the specific implementation and thus raise it to a higher order process is simply unfounded.
7. Even if it were so that the law was repealed after the result of the referendum, if we look at the referendum for what it is rather than the higher order process as the plaintiffs put it, a repeal would still nullify its binding. As our former colleague Ibney has stated, binding referendum results are a responsibility which the parliament imposes on itself. By passing a law the parliament created, they have put a rule on themselves that they shall obey. The plaintiff uses such language as that the applicants had "reasonable expectation" that the referendum would be implemented. Does this mean that once there is public participation, expectation or reliance on a parliamentarily imposed responsibility on the parliament, that it may not be revoked? How would this affect budget laws, criminal laws, election laws? We reiterate the point made in 5. We stress parliamentary supremacy.
8. This is by no means a statement on the ethics of the action taken by the Parliament. While the repeal’s timing may be politically controversial, courts do not adjudicate legislative motive absent constitutional prohibition. This should have, and should be, a political question rather than a legal one. Expectations do matter as compelling arguments in constructing the motives for a crime or evaluating a reasonable belief test. Not what the politicians do with their policies. One would reasonably expect that a politician should serve the good of the people. Unfortunately, you cant sue them for not doing so.

SIGNED. Sec. ColonelKai. Solicitor General
Office of Litigation, 5601 MoJ Building, New Hamilton
This 18th of December 2025.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO THE CHANCELLERY FOR REVIEW.
chablink.gif
 
Unless there are any objections to the matter, the court will recess pending verdict without hearing closing statements.​
 
CCA.png
IN THE CHANCERY OF
THE KINGDOM OF ALEXANDRIA
VERDICT

Verdict written by High Chancellor AsexualDinosaur, joined by Chancellor Juniperfig.

Summary of parties positions
Facts in Dispute

There were three facts in dispute within this case: 5, 17, & 20.

Fact 5 is barely different from Fact 6 other than to convey that the Crown had ‘neglected their duty’ -- It’s accepted as fact that the Crown did not disburse any Stimulus Checks.
Fact 17, which the crown denies reads - ‘The Plaintiffs contend that facts 1-16, particularly their timing and effect, amounted to a retroactive nullification of a legally binding referendum and an unlawful denial of the right to vote.’
Fact 20, which the crown denies reads - ‘The Plaintiffs contend that this lack of funding rendered the MoTF unable to fulfill their statutory duty under the Stimulus Act prior to its repeal.’


Arguments

Plaintiff

The Plaintiff in this case argues that by repealing the law that set out referendums to be binding, the Crown violated their constitutional right to vote in referendums. It is the Plaintiff’s position that the right to vote is not just the right to cast a ballot, but the right to have that vote be ‘meaningful, binding, and respected’ under the law.

The Plaintiff suggests that the Crown failed to ‘Comply with lawfully enacted legislation and referendum results’ by not complying with the Stimulus Act and the Civic Engagement Act as well that the appropriations were withheld from the MoTF which had obstructed its ability to execute upon the Stimulus Act.

Crown
The Crown argues that ‘a law is no more after its repeal, yet it can have effects after its repeal’ - ‘Acts which have taken place during the validity of a law are still in effect’.

The Crown notes that the referendum was ongoing, but had not been resolved at the time the law was repealed, as well that the MoTF, while authorised to issue the stimulus, had not approved of the stimulus by the time the law had repealed.

The Crown asserts that the MoTF had no legal obligation to issue the stimulus by law. And that the referendum should be called under the provisions of the amended law and not the previous - repealed - law.


Timeline
May 6th, 2025 A.P.019 was signed into law by King WackJap with § 3.1 ‘All eligible StateCraft players shall receive a one-time stimulus payment of £1,200 upon approval by the Ministry of Trade and Finance.’

May 6th, 2025 A.P.021 was signed into law by King WackJap with § 4.4 ‘ If the referendum passes with a simple majority, the government is obligated to comply with the result, unless the petition is relating to:
(a) A judicial matter;
(b) A matter relating to a player’s employment with a government Ministry;
(c) Repealing a law;
(d) A foreign relations matter.’


May 9th, 2025 Stoppers as MoTF Minister, announced the MoTF was accepting applicants for the stimulus.

June 16th, 2025 at 4:23 PM there was a referendum held which would be open for 72 hours.

June 19th, 2025 at 3:26 PM A.P.01-020 was signed into law by King WackJap which amends A.P.021

June 19th, 2025 at 4:41 PM the results of the referendum were posted, with the result being that it passed.


Right to Vote


K.A Const. § V Art. 22.2 ‘Every citizen has the right to vote in elections and referendums provided the player meets the citizenship requirements set by law.’

The Plaintiff intends to interpret this section to mean not just that a citizen has a right to issue a vote, but that their vote produces some result in kind.

If we consider a situation in which an election or referendum might be terminated early, would then that election constitutionally require some implementation or result as an effect of having taken place? Certainly not - There’s a number of reasons to terminate an election or referendum that in turn would cause issues if we implemented the effects of -- Or we accept that it would be unconstitutional to terminate an election or referendum at any point.
Neither of these options lends itself to a practical interpretation.

If we dismiss this consideration and only address a vote that is carried out legally and fully - Does your right to vote in full and legal elections bear a right to a consequence?
In the case of elections for a seat at Parliament, the constitution itself demands a result. Id at § I Art. 5.5 ‘Voting System. Members will be elected according to a proportional voting system defined by Parliament.’

Here, we have a similar case in which the referendum, when it had begun, stated that the result would be binding for Parliament. This can be seen within P-001 which displays A.P.021, which has since been amended by A.P01-020 and later repealed by A.P.01-044, which had stated - ‘If the referendum passes with a simple majority, the government is obligated to comply with the result [...]’
There was a statute that bound the government to comply with the result of a referendum.
However, ignoring this statute for now - The plaintiff would seem to argue that it's constitutionally right that the vote have a binding result.

The right to vote does not mean that all votes are carried through to their conclusion. If the government created a vote or referendum for something absurd or impossible, it would certainly not be a violation of rights to not enact on an impossible request.

Whenever the government would hold an election or referendum, citizens have a right to partake in this vote and this vote cannot be restricted or hindered so long as they meet the citizenship requirements.
A vote, on its own. Has no binding effect or power. This right on its own does not demand for any binding resolution to votes or referendums. Other sections of the constitution insofar as it relates to elections for Parliament do demand that a vote have a resulting effect that would be binding.


Binding under Stimulus Act
There is the basic question of whether or not the referendum was binding upon its passing. There are a few contending factors here that unfortunately don’t seem to line up with the facts presented.

First, It’s a matter of contention whether or not the MoTF had consented to the stimulus; The closest we can get to this fact is P-005 & P-006. The MoTF Minister at the time, Stoppers, titles his announcement “1,200 STIMULUS NOW AVAILABLE”.
Using specific messaging within the post such as

“rolling out a one-time 1,200 stimulus payment”
A section labeled “How to claim it” with a link to the form
“We’re committed to supporting every citizen.”


Noting that Stoppers had been the very author of the Stimulus Act and had made this post, we find it very hard to come to the conclusion that there wasn’t some intent to disburse checks.

P-008 shows us the results of the forum that the MoTF had collected. We can see that there are 89 entries. If we assume that all entries were valid and would be paid out by the MoTF the total value of that would have resulted in: 106,800 pounds.

Noting that just prior to this form being rolled out the SoTK had been published, and noted that the government in total had 198,082 pounds, It would be easy to understand why a MoTF minister might not have signed off on this after seeing the final cost in consideration for the balance of the government, as well as the budget never accommodating for this payout in its entirety. We notice from April to May the MoTF gets a 10,000 pound increase, which is nearly 188,000 pounds shy of what would be required to issue this payment.

As far as approval from the MoTF minister, given that no direct approval was shown to this court, We cannot in good conscience find the announcement to claim funds as a signal for approval from the MoTF Minister of the time. If there was another MoTF minister after Stoppers we were provided no evidence that they had issued approval either.


Binding under Civic Engagement Act

The argument for the referendum to be binding under this act is the argument that the act itself applies the binding nature onto the referendum and then, after the repeal of the law that would give that effect, still has that effect.

We believe there to be two fundamental issues with this idea. First, the original statute read ‘If the referendum passes with a simple majority, the government is obligated to comply with the result, unless the petition is relating to’, At the point that the law had been amended the referendum had not yet passed and the binding effect had not applied yet.

Secondly, once a law is repealed its force of law is no longer there. The moment that Parliament had passed the Aye Act, the Civic Engagement Act lost the ability to be binding under previous conditions- the referendum would’ve been subject to the Aye Act.

The defence we believe sums it up quite well.
“While the repeal’s timing may be politically controversial, courts do not adjudicate legislative motive absent constitutional prohibition. This should have, and should be, a political question rather than a legal one.[...] One would reasonably expect that a politician should serve the good of the people. Unfortunately, you can't sue them for not doing so.”

While one may find that Parliament's actions were unsavory,
the democratic tool at your fingertips is the electoral system.

Conclusion

We, The Chancery, find that under the claims for relief:

Count I: We deny the claim for relief on the basis that the defendant did not violate the plaintiff(s) right to vote.

Count II: We deny the claim for relief on the basis that there was a lack of claim for the named defendant. Following precedent as found in Case 12 (Ch. 2025) ‘Parliament here merely passed laws—even if said laws are unconstitutional (and thus invalid), Parliament itself did not cause any injury to Claimant. ‘
The court encourages readers to read the long-form from the Honorable Former High Chancellor SmallFries as the snippet does not do his words justice.

Count III: We deny the claim for relief on the basis that the MoTF minister did not issue approval and that the referendum under the Civic Engagement Act post the Aye Act did not make the referendum binding. As such the government did not fail to execute their obligations nor did they violate their duty to execute the laws enacted by Parliament.


As such the Prayers for relief as requested by the Plaintiff(s) are denied in their entirety.

The Chancey finds in favor of the Crown.


Thanks to all parties for their time and patience.
 
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